Terrorism Focus - Volume III, Issue 3
Submitted by Templar Titan on Thu, 02/02/2006 - 07:26.
* Al-Qaeda's Weapons Specialist Killed in Pakistani Airstrike
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Al-Qaeda's Weapons Specialist Killed in Pakistani Airstrike Abu Khabab al-Masri, the unconventional weapons specialist of al-Qaeda, was killed in the January 13 airstrike at Damadola in Pakistan. His death, reported by the Pakistani daily Dawn (www.dawn.com ) quoting security sources, is especially important given Osama bin Laden's January 19 audiotape in which he spoke of operations underway in the United States. Many conceive that a possible attack from bin Laden will take the form of an unconventional device of some sort, and the prospect of such an attack, according to newly-appointed head of counter-terrorism at the U.S. State Department Henry Crumpton, is considered merely "a question of time."
The 53-year old Egyptian national Abu Khabab (full name: Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid 'Umar) was of pivotal importance in the development of al-Qaeda's unconventional capability, and the training of large numbers of operatives in the requisite skills, an importance reflected by the US$5 million reward posted for his arrest. Abu Khabab's jihad activity goes back to the period of the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981 as a senior member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. His importance to the developing al-Qaeda movement was recognized early. He played a senior role after August 1998 when, following the destruction of the al-Shifa facility in Sudan (suspected of the manufacture of chemical weapons), he set up and ran the unconventional weapons program Project al-Zabadi ("Yoghurt") in Afghanistan.
As director of the Derunta camp situated near Jalalabad, Abu Khabab is said to have tested nerve gas and to have conducted filmed experiments with cyanide on dogs. The most famous alumnus of Derunta was the "millennium bomber" Ahmed Ressam, convicted in July 2005 for a plot to bomb Los Angeles Airport on New Year's Eve 1999. Ressam mentioned that al-Qaeda was testing toxins at the camp for use in assassination attempts of Western political and intelligence officials and that many students were being trained from all over the world. From this period Abu Khabab had been active in publishing and distributing training manuals that contained recipes for crude chemical and biological weapons.
Following U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Abu Khabab dropped off the radar, although his name appeared in investigations into several attempted unconventional weapons attacks, such as the failed chemical and poison attacks in Europe in the run-up to the coalition intervention against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Some of the arrested suspects in these attacks had received training in the Caucasus, confirming information that successors to the Afghan Derunta camp had been set up in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.
The most serious attempt at an unconventional weapons attack from jihadist extremists was the April 2004 incident in the Jordanian capital Amman, where government estimates put the potential casualty rate of al-Zarqawi's aide Azmi al-Jayyousi's targeting of the key installations in the city at 20,000 plus. Abu Khabab's involvement in this plot is suspected but not proven. Yet until Abu Khabab's death, "Project al-Zabadi" was considered to be still in operation in one form or another.
The New York Post indicated in December 2003 that a full-scale manhunt was underway for Abu Khabab, motivated by suspicions that the Egyptian scientist was actively engaged in the construction of a "dirty bomb" for use on attacks in the United States. The Pakistan bomb strike at Damadola, therefore, appears to be a significant operational success. Abu Khabab's value to the jihad is his pivotal role in turning one of many of al-Qaeda's wish lists into practical advances in the production of unconventional weaponry. The question remains about the numbers and expertise of Abu Khabab's students from camps in Afghanistan, Georgia and Pakistan that are still at large.
Al-Zawahiri Addresses Reform in Muslim World Murad Batal Shishani
Al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Egyptian national Ayman al-Zawahiri, appeared in a video-recording broadcast by al-Jazeera news network on January 6. What is striking in this statement is his discussion of reform and freedom in the Arab and Islamic worlds. In his latest statement, al-Zawahiri discusses reform and freedom in the Arab world, and draws a connection between jihad and freedom-a new element in al-Qaeda's discourse. He stated, "My Muslim nation, you will not enjoy free elections, protected sanctity, governments which are being called to account by the people and a respectable judiciary unless you are free from the crusader-Zionist occupation and the corrupted governments, and this will not be fulfilled but with Jihad." He criticized the Muslim Brotherhood experience in Egypt because they believe in political participation. This is, by the way, an old opinion of al-Zawahiri, who wrote a book on the political experience of the Muslim Brotherhood entitled "Bitter Harvest." He also criticized elections in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and described the democratic developments in the Arab World as "the fractions of freedom that America allows by force, and which wouldn't be allowed unless under mujahideen attack in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine.
What is interesting is the new linkage between jihad and issues of freedom, rights, and the integrity of the judiciary. It seems al-Qaeda is keen to address the frustration in the Arab world that stems from the absence, or slow pace, of political and economic reform. This was clear in the results of the online poll conducted by aljazeera.net <http://www.jamestown.org/aljazeera.net> . In response to the question, "Do you agree with al-Zawahiri's statement?" 57.9% agreed with the statement, 25.7% disagreed, and 16.3% partially agreed. The number of respondents totaled 30,487.
These numbers indicate that al-Zawahiri's criticism of reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds resonates among lay people. It shows that al-Qaeda's change of discourse aims at winning public opinion and at increasing the number of sympathizers more than an attempt to stress its ideological tenets, especially since the issue of "public opinion" has never been a major priority with the Salafi-Jihadist movement in general. It appears that this is the new element in al-Qaeda's coming statements because the movement is attempting to adapt with the present and future pressures. Internet Mujahideen Analyze the Latest Bin Laden Audio Tape The rarity of an Osama bin Laden commentary (one year after the last broadcast in December 2004) is stirring a wealth of commentary in the world's media. The focus is on its veracity and on the implications for the West of the truce offer coupled with a threat should it be rejected. Yet for the mujahideen, while many of the concerns are similar, there is also both considerable relief at the re-appearance of bin Laden-his absence from the airwaves was causing some distress on the internet forums-and eulogistic celebration of the genius of the "Artful Arab.
The rarity and brevity of the bin Laden message, and even the low production quality of the tape, justify for the mujahideen a detailed examination of its contents. The promise of an imminent strike on the United States is creating much excitement, but it is the issue of the truce that excites the most extended discussions. For Dr. Muhammad Hafiz, a participant on the al-Saqifa forum (www.alsakifah.org/vb <http://www.jamestown.org/www.alsakifah.org/vb> ), writing on January 20, the issue of the truce is the main interest. Taking up bin Laden's phrase that "We have no objection to responding to you about a long term truce according to just conditions which we would honor, for we are a Nation whom God has forbidden to use treachery or deceit," Dr. Hafiz underlines the moral superiority that Muslims could thus claim, in that "in war or peace they never engage in treachery."
Interestingly, this argument was disputed, to a chorus of loathing, by one signing himself Ibn Umar al-Hajj, who noted how the 9/11 hijackers had actually breached these conditions by employing deception in using their Saudi passports to gain entry visas, all of which come under Islamic regulations on strict observance of the ahd ("compact") with an enemy. Dr. Hafiz elaborates on the meaning of the truce offer: first, for bin Laden to present himself as "a statesman capable of offering a truce from a position of strength"; second, to pre-empt Bush from pulling American forces out of Iraq without an admission of defeat; third, "to absolve himself before God and the world prior to the coming strike inside America which will shake it to its foundations." In short, it is part of the established warning cycle.
While Western observers may point to bin Laden's inability to declare a truce on operational grounds-given the fact that, contrary to bin Laden's assurances in the tape, Spanish intelligence forces have had to foil recurrent attempts at attacks since the April 2004 Madrid bombings-Ibn Umar cast his doubts in terms of Islamic law. "Does bin Laden represent himself," he asks, "or al-Qaeda, or all Muslims? It is actually the Amir al-Muslimeen [Mulla Umar] who is the only one qualified to offer a truce in the name of the Nation."
For Nusayr Muhyi al-Sunan, writing on the same forum, the point has been
In fact, bin Laden's genius, according to this analysis, is in cornering the enemy into being unable to respond either way to the tape. Indeed, the threat of an attack, bin Mahmud insists, has already achieved its purpose. It keeps the Americans "living in fear, exhausting themselves and expending resources on [contingency] planning, divided their ranks and damaged their economy." Yet, according to this argument, the Americans cannot afford to ignore the new threat, "which will have the same effect on them!" As to the form of the coming attack: "it will be a light or moderate blow, designed to show them his capability and the seriousness of the issue; an unexpected type of attack, revealing the inventiveness of the soldiers of Islam, following which it will be of a wholly different order" (www.alsakifah.org/vb
Morale Boost Both jihadi and Western analysts lay emphasis on the importance of the audio recording for morale boosting purposes. From postings such as the above, however, an important significance of the "four minutes that shook the world" audiotape is not only that bin Laden is alive, but also that the religiously defined strategy toward dominion remains intact. "The secret of the tape," bin Mahmud insists, is as a confirmation of God's words on infidels spending their wealth to impede the jihad: "They will spend it, then it will become an anguish for them, then they will be conquered." (Qur'an VIII, 36). The "anguish," he explains, is that the millions spent by the enemy have been overturned by a "cheaply made, technologically rough tape." In other words, it is an epoch-making demonstration of triumphant asymmetric warfare.
Al-Zarqawi Reportedly Moves to New Area of Iraq Mahan Abedin
A report by al-Jazeera satellite TV on January 22, citing Iraqi military officials who claim that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, is in the Diyala province (northeast of Baghdad), runs contrary to the assessments of Iraqi intelligence services and U.S. military intelligence in Iraq. The new Iraqi intelligence service (headed by Mohammad Shahwani), U.S. military intelligence and the Badr Organization (which operates an independent parallel intelligence service) have long believed that the core of the al-Zarqawi network is concentrated around the Euphrates River valley in northern Anbar, along which the key towns of Qaim, Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, Habbaniyah and Fallujah are situated. These towns are considered to be the most insecure and dangerous in Iraq, where insurgents have-at one time or another-exerted complete control.
The assessment of U.S. and Iraqi intelligence derives from intense counter-insurgency operations and the interrogation of thousands of captured insurgents. Moreover, Anbar and Nineveh provinces are the only areas in Iraq where the al-Zarqawi network has developed roots, not least because of the proximity to the Syrian border, from where the vast majority of jihadis infiltrate the strife-torn country. Given the realities on the ground, the al-Zarqawi network is highly unlikely to move key figures outside its main base of operation for prolonged periods.
More broadly, Diyala is a stronghold of the so-called "Nationalist" insurgency, where even indigenous Islamist rebels (mostly connected to the "Islamic Army in Iraq") have been discouraged from operating in the province. The local characteristics of Diyala's insurgents, coupled with the proliferation of Iraqi nationalist organizations (which operate in the open under the guise of civil society forums), make it extremely difficult for jihadis to operate in the province. If al-Zarqawi was operating from Diyala, it is likely that he would be quickly identified and killed by Iraqi rebels who are now beginning to distance themselves from extremist insurgents and jihadis.
After Anbar province, Diyala ranks as the most strife-torn region in Iraq. There are four factors that explain the volatility of this most strategic region of Iraq's 18 provinces. First of all, Diyala has historically been a bastion of Arab and Iraqi nationalism (Baathist or otherwise). The province's strategic location and its proximity to Iran make it a highly prized and sensitive region in the eyes of Iraqi nationalists. While the downfall of Saddam Hussein had a catastrophic impact on the morale of Arab and Iraqi nationalists in Diyala, these forces quickly mobilized to fight the U.S. and its Iraqi allies.
Second, Diyala is the only province in Iraq where Shi'ites and Sunnis are represented in roughly equal numbers. While there are no official statistics, the former are believed to have a slight majority. The finely balanced sectarian demographics became a violently contentious issue after the intervention, which has promoted identity politics in Iraq. Broadly speaking, the Shi'ites in Diyala regard SCIRI and the Badr Organization as protectors and employers, while the Sunnis see these organizations as Iranian-backed quislings that are exploiting the occupation to consolidate power.
Third, SCIRI and the Badr Organization have had a strong presence in Diyala since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In fact, the Badr Organization (in its previous capacity as the Badr Corps) entered Iraq from the Diyala province from April 9, 2003 to early May 2003 and established bases in Baqouba (the province's capital), Miqdadiyah and Khalis. In that crucial month, Badr forces fought pitched battles with remnants of the ousted regime, including Baath party diehards, Diyala tribesmen loyal to Saddam Hussein and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (Terrorism Monitor, Volume 1: Issue 5, November 7, 2003). As the insurgency deteriorated in Diyala, the Badr Organization steadily increased its presence and operations.
Finally, the presence of an Iranian dissident group, the formerly-armed Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), in Diyala has created tensions between prominent tribesmen and other influential actors in and around Khalis, where the MKO's Ashraf base is located. While the MKO (which is classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government and the European Union) was disarmed in May 2003 and the movement of its members are supposedly monitored by U.S. forces, the organization regularly hosts meetings in Ashraf in which tribesmen and other influential individuals from Diyala (many with links to the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein) voice support for the organization, demand a withdrawal of foreign troops and strongly attack the new Iraqi government. The emergence of Ashraf as a platform for Iraqi nationalists has prompted the Badr Organization to increase surveillance operations in and around Khalis, and to engage in intimidation campaigns against key individuals who visit the camp.
The visit to Mashad (northeast Iran) by a Diyala tribal, legal and religious delegation reveals an intriguing (and under-reported) feature of the Iraq conflict. The delegation was hosted by the Habilian Association (http://habilian.com
Alternate Futures for Thailand's Insurgency Zachary Abuza The Thai insurgency has formally entered its third straight year. Between January 2004 and January 2006, more than 1,200 people were killed. In January 2004, violent incidents averaged 30 per month; by December 2004, violent incidents averaged 120 per month. By June 2005, bombings averaged more than one per day. More than 300 were killed and more than 300 wounded in the six months following the introduction of the Emergency Decree in July 2005 (The Bangkok Post, October 24, 2005). In 2006 alone, 19 people have been killed, seven in one day-five of whom were policemen. The presence of over 40,000 security forces has done little to stop the insurgency.
While the majority of victims are killed in drive by shootings and assassinations, the technical capacity of the bombs has increased dramatically. Thai Muslim bomb-makers now assemble 10kg bombs composed of a variety of components, including powergel, TNT, potassium chlorate, and ammonium nitrate. The detonators have become sophisticated to the point that the government had to block all un-registered pre-paid cell phones in the three southernmost provinces. Authorities also have evidence that the militants are now experimenting with infrared devices as detonators, although they have not consistently deployed these bombs (The Nation, November 29, 2005). The Thai militants are also learning techniques from abroad. According to a senior intelligence official, "They have stolen cement kilometer road markers to make bombs, for which we have seen instructions posted on some web sites in the Middle East" (Reuters, October 6, 2005).
The insurgents have become more sophisticated in a number of other ways. Not only are attacks becoming more clinically precise, but there was an increase in coordinated attacks in 2005. For example, October 26, 2005 saw 34 coordinated night-time attacks that left six people dead in raids (Associated Press, October 27, 2005). In another incident, 18 locations in six different districts were hit in one night. In another, militants hit two dozen outposts in one night, killing five and seizing 42 firearms (The Nation, October 27, 2005). More than 100 government weapons were stolen by militants between November and December 2005. On January 18, militants launched 101 coordinated arson attacks across three provinces.
What was also notable about attacks in 2005 was that they became more shocking and more brutal with the purpose of inciting revulsion and fear. There have now been 24 beheadings, one of which was done before a crowded tea house. In October 2005, 15 militants stormed a Buddhist temple and hacked to death a monk, killed a novice monk, torched their bodies, and set the living quarters on fire. The incident gripped the country (The Nation, While the government claims it has arrested 190 insurgents responsible for conducting or planning operations, there are still glaring shortages of information. Very few if any of the leaders of the insurgency have been arrested. There are still some 247 "red zones," villages controlled by insurgents. There is little reason to share the government's optimism. Indeed, on January 19, Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Wannasathit, who claimed credit for the 190 arrests, recently lashed out at the state's intelligence services for their inability to stop the bloodletting.
The intelligence failure has been so great because Thai officials have rounded up the usual suspects: the old ethno-nationalist groups, such as the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), that were active through the mid-1990s but are now defunct. The current insurgency is being led by two Islamist organizations that the Thai government has always considered There is also a misunderstanding about the nature of the insurgency. This is not an insurgency about physical space, but an insurgency about mental space. Moreover, it is an intra-Muslim conflict. Since March 2005, militants have killed more of their co-religionists than they have Buddhists. Put simply, the militants are ideologically and religiously motivated; they are trying to impose a very austere and intolerant form of Islam on their society and they countenance no opposition to this. The militants are going after not just collaborators, or individuals who receive a government salary, but also Muslim clerics who perform funeral rites for murtad, or apostates, as well as teachers who work in schools that have mixed curriculums. The militants have issued a number of threats to their own community. Such threats include forcing businesses closed on Fridays, with the failure to obey resulting in death or the amputation of ears; militants also warn imams not to conduct funeral rites for Muslim security forces, guards at state-schools, government employees, or "anyone who receive salaries from the state," and warn people not to send their children to state-run schools. These threats are made from a perceived position of strength. The militants have introduced the Wahhabi culture of takfiri-condemning fellow Muslims for their lax interpretation of Islam. They seem undeterred that the threats are broadly unpopular among the Muslim population. The militants are not trying to create a mass-based movement, but rather to impose a strict interpretation of Islam on society. They believe that this outcome will strengthen the Muslim community. It appears that their strategy is working since the stream of intelligence from the villages has dried up. Three Potential Possibilities for the Future of Thailand's Insurgency The least likely possibility for the future of Thailand's insurgency is the development of a broader insurgency. This development is unlikely because the insurgents do not have enough personnel, guns or a steady supply of ammunition. The insurgents would also face a more hostile external environment from the Malaysians. Additionally, it is likely that the insurgents understand that a broadened insurgency is one that the Royal Thai Army is the best equipped to counter. An emboldened insurgency would require 1,000 to 2,000 men and significantly more material resources. Moreover, the training and quality of the insurgency to date has wavered. Some groups have improved their hit and run tactics and have begun using a road-side IED with a small arms assault. Yet these improved tactics have not occurred on a regular basis. Indeed, attacks seem disjointed because the cell structure is so compartmentalized and autonomous from the leadership. The second possibility is for the insurgency to move to the next level by launching attacks on Bangkok or Phuket. This is obviously the nightmare scenario for the government, although one that it vehemently denies is a possibility. To date, the militants have shown an unwillingness to engage in this type of operation. They clearly have the technical capability to undertake such attacks, but are obviously alarmed at the government's reaction to such an operation. There are insurgent leaders, however, who precisely want to provoke a harsh government response that will legitimize them in the eyes of their constituents. Moreover, if the current rate of arrests remains steady, they may engage in terrorism out of desperation. Indeed, there have been a number of arrests-including three individuals scouting targets in Bangkok in November 2005-suggesting that an attack on an out-of-area soft target is being considered as an option. Such an attack would also attract greater attention and international support for their cause, which, to date, has been negligible. The third and most plausible possibility is that the conflict remains at the status quo: a low-level insurgency coupled with intensified dakwah (religious propagation activities). It appears that this is the path upon which the insurgents have settled. First, in their eyes it has been very successful. The insurgency is much further along than was expected a year ago. Second, it is within their current range of material and human resources and technical know-how. Third, they need this type of violence Yet, this strategy also makes the insurgents vulnerable in a number of ways. First, if they cannot raise the violence to the next level, then it becomes a menace in the region, but one that can be contained and that people learn to live with. Second, it gives the government time to really improve their intelligence operations. For instance, already there is more actionable intelligence that has led to more arrests. Moreover, it gives the government ways to come up with additional counter-insurgent plans, such as the mobile phone registration. In the face of a government counter-insurgency, the militants can easily retreat back to the mosques and pondoks in which they can recruit and proselytize anew. In such a scenario, the government would declare victory while the insurgency would simply incubate as it did over the past decade.
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************************ Terrorism Focus is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. It is edited by Stephen Ulph, a specialist in economic and political developments of the Middle East and North Africa. He is the founder and editor of the Terrorism Security Monitor and editor and analyst of Islamic Affairs for Jane's Information Group. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the Terrorism Focus, please contact the publications coordinator at pubs@jamestown.org. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly prohibited by law. The Jamestown Foundation Copyright (c) 1983-2006 The Jamestown Foundation.
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