Terrorism Focus - Volume II, Issue 12
Submitted by Templar Titan on Tue, 07/05/2005 - 19:37.
| IN THIS ISSUE:
* New brigade for ‘Iraqi'
suicide bombers IN-DEPTH * "The Pious Caliphate Will Start >From Afghanistan": Is
al-Qaeda's Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding? |
| New brigade for ‘Iraqi' suicide bombers
Al-Zarqawi's group Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn issued a statement on June 20 declaring that it had formed a sub-branch of the Al-Bara bin Malek Brigade dedicated to suicide operations. The audio posting by the head of the new group Abu Dujana al-Ansari, indicated that "a unit of martyrs named al-Ansar, belonging to the Martyr Brigades of Al-Baraa bin Malek, has been formed." The Wahdat Istish-hadiyin ‘Iraqiyin (Iraqi Martyrdom Unit), as reported on the Mufakkirat al-Islam website, is made up exclusively of native volunteers. The formation of the unit, the statement outlined, came "due to strong insistence from our Iraqi brothers and their desire for Paradise," and that volunteers had applied "in their tens to sign their names to meet their Maker" [www.islammemo.cc]. The announcement comes at a time of increased violence, in which ordinary Iraqis are increasingly involved, and of waxing criticism of the methodology of the resistance. A recent statement, purported made by al-Zarqawi, defending the killing of non-combatant Muslims excited much comment on the jihadi forums, which relayed the debate on the lawfulness of his action, or deplored the attempt being made to ‘drive a wedge between the mujahideen and the Ulema' [www.alsakifah.org]. It also coincides with criticisms aired in the media as to the ethnicity of the majority of suicide bombers, illustrated by comments by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari that most of the suicide bombers behind attacks in Iraq were foreign nationals. One report aired by the New York Times on June 22 suggested that the nationalist and jihadist camps of the resistance were falling out, given increasing evidence of armed fire exchanges between them. Al-Qaeda ideologue killed in al-Qaim A June 23 posting to an Islamist website presented the text of an announcement from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi concerning the death of Sheikh Abdullah Mohammad Rashid al-Rashoud in the Iraqi town of al-Qaim. In customary fashion the statement, as posted on the jihadist Al-Qal'a forum, celebrated the death as a victory: "Let the Islamic Nation rejoice in the martyrdom of one of the most outstanding standards of beneficence, jihad and knowledge." The eulogy went on to describe his ‘participating in the battles of al-Qa'im" explaining that the Sheikh met his end as a result of air strikes on mujahid positions, thus joining the ‘caravans of the martyrs ridden before by Sheikh Abu Anas [al-Shami]. The forum entries following this entry are filled with expressions of congratulations and prayers for his soul. [www.qal3ati.net] Sheikh al-Rashoud was one of the most influential ideologues for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, famous for his January 2004 Bayan ila al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Declaration to the Islamic Nation), in which he challenged the Saudi government's legitimacy in terms of Islamic Law and was featured on the 26 most wanted list issued by the security authorities. His disappearance from the scene in Saudi Arabia last summer was the cause of much speculation. It was thought that Al-Rashoud had been killed alongside al-Qaeda field commander of the time Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin in June 2004 following an armed confrontation with the security forces. However, this was denied by Saudi authorities at the time and the mystery was compounded by a later story, published by the Saudi daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat on March 15, which quoted ‘informed sources' stating that Al-Rashoud had actually been slain by his mujahid colleagues. This apparently had been due to differences with Al-Muqrin on the Islamic propriety of the commander's military actions, which were targeting non-combatant Muslim civilians. Al-Muqrin and Faysal al-Dakhil were said to have driven him to an isolated place to effect a cure of his ‘madness', following which the Shaykh was never seen again [www.aawsat.com]. The present announcement does little to resolve that mystery, but his claimed exit from Saudi Arabia to al-Qaim, is symptomatic of the tightening squeeze placed by the authorities on jihadist activities in the Kingdom, as demonstrated by the raid on the Sawt al-Jihad publishing house late last year, which in the pages of its Sawt al-Jihad online magazine published regular ideological treatises from the Sheikh relative to the jihad. Al-Qaeda in Iraq endorses their cohorts in Algeria On June 15 the "Media Department of al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers," the Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda, issued a statement that included an endorsement of the Algerian mujahideen. Its statement "May Allah bless the work of those heroes who took upon themselves to fight the apostates in Mauritania" in particular fixes the object of the endorsement as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which claimed responsibility for an attack upon a Mauritanian military outpost on June 3-4. This, the GSPC claimed, was an act of "revenge for our brothers who were arrested by the apostate Mauritanian regime over the recent period, and as a support for the oppressed Muslims there." That attack was later established as having been carried out by the GSPC sub-group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, termed the Groupe salafist libre, which operates independently of the GSPC (See Focus Vol II, issue 11). The endorsement opens up a number of issues relating to the coherence of the jihadist groups in the region. Last December an Algerian group announced on the al-Ma'sada jihadist forum how it was transferring its allegiance to Osama bin Laden, calling itself "TheOrganization of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Berbers" [www.alm2sda.net]. More recently, on May 8, the Qa'idat al-Jihad fi al-Jaza'ir (al-Qaeda [base] of the Jihad in Algeria) announced its appearance on the jihadist Kalimat al-Haqq site [www.rightword.net], citing the demoralization of the jihadist groups in Algeria, their bad name through association with massacres of civilians, and the questionable motivation and loyalty of the leaders to the cause. The statement encouraged the irredentist remnants to join ‘a new cause.' The present endorsement may be a positive response to attempts by GSPC remnants to restore credibility. Indeed the attack on the Mauritanian outpost may be partly seen in this light. The Mauritanian attack came after pressure from the government at Nouakchott against camps training mujahideen for the Iraqi theatre. In Algeria the number of foreign Islamist militants arrested has increased in recent months, an unusual development which has worried the authorities. On the same day of the endorsement by al-Qaeda, six Yemeni students were arrested in eastern Algeria, suspected of belonging to an unnamed network linked to al-Qaeda. This incident, and the message from al-Qaeda in Iraq, suggest that a greater degree of co-ordination is being attempted, either in the form of direct links between the groups, or at least as an attempt to re-package the activities as part of one ‘global jihad' movement. Whatever the exact explanation, the Algerian jihadi theatre, as proclaimed by the GSPC statement on the Mauritanian attack, looks set to expand. Attacks in Algeria, despite a net decline, have peaked recently, and there have been renewed clashes on June 12-13 between GSPC militants and the Mauritanian military in the desert area near the border with Mali. Soldiers are now to be deployed in greater strength along the border areas with Mali and Algeria [www.mapeci.com]. New Jihadist group emerges in Syria The Syrian news agency (SANA) reported on June 9 that security authorities had been engaged in a three-hour armed confrontation resulting in the death of Abu Umar, the leader of a cell of the previously unknown Tanzim Jund al-Sham lil-Jihad wal-Tawhid, (Organization of the Army of [Greater Syria] for Jihad and Monotheism). Alongside a stash of weaponry, documents seized at the scene of the raid, at a residential apartment in southern Damascus, indicated that the new group was engaged in preparing areas in Damascus and the surrounding region for future operations and for sending its members abroad for training [www.sana.org]. The 42-year-old shopkeeper and leader of the group killed in the June 9 assault, Abu Umar, was a radical takfiri, anathematizing not only the Syrian state and its institutions, but also the shaykhs of mosques and the institution of the Friday prayer. The raid on the apartment follows closely on an earlier raid which first established the existence of a wide-ranging takfiri Islamist organization bearing the title Tanzim Jund al-Sham lil-Jihad wal-Tawhid, replete with publications, administrative structure and weaponry. Syria has been witness recently to a growing takfiri threat, as evidenced by the death of Sheikh Muhammad al-Khiznawi. Suspected of being tortured and killed in custody, a report by the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat indicates he died at the hands of takfiri members who claimed his death was due to ‘cultural differences' [www.daralhayat.com]. According to details given in the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan, the Tanzim Jund al-Sham lil-Jihad wal-Tawhid group is said to have already divided up Syria into five zones, each constituting an ‘Islamic emirate' with its own emir and organizational structure. However, the scope of the group was also said to extend beyond Syria's borders to the area not only of ‘Greater Syria' (which includes Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan) but also Iraq and Egypt [www.alwatan.com.sa]. The division of Syria into operational zones suggests an Algerian model. Algeria has been similarly divided up by the mujahideen and the close connection between members of jihadist groups in the two countries was illustrated recently by the capture at Damascus on May 25 of Sakir Adil, the Algerian webmaster of the GSPC website [www.jihad-algeria.com]. Syrian security had been tracking the group for some time, according to some reports ever since November last year, when a member was killed attempting to plant a roadside bomb. One report states how a valuable lead came from the mother of the would-be bomber, who is said to have alerted the authorities after overhearing her widowed daughter-in-law discussing with Abu Umar using the granddaughter as a live bomb. The obscurity surrounding the group provoked speculation as to whether its existence was a fabrication of the Syrian secret services, designed to curry favor abroad and improve the regime's image as a ‘victim' of terrorism. However, a Saudi analyst writing for Al-Hayat highlighted how the group's name goes back to 1999 and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's training camp, which he set up in the western Afghan city of Herat. The name ‘Jund al-Sham' dates from this time and indicated the future theatre of action envisaged by the group. The analyst focuses on the nature of the doctrinal literature discovered in the raided apartment. In particular on the use of the Qur'anic verse: "Fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you, and let them find harshness in you" [IX:123] as opposed to the emblematic sura used by bin Laden: "Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you" [II:190] [www.daralhayat.com and www.elaph.com]. The group should be distinguished from others bearing similar names, such as Tanzim Jund al-Sham that claimed responsibility for the bombing at the Doha theatre in Qatar in March, or the Jund al-Sham that operated in the Ain al-Helwa Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and which claimed the killing of a Hezbollah member. Latest video from al-Zawahiri challenges political reforms The latest al-Qaeda video, aired in part by al-Jazeera television on June 17, and the first to appear since last February, bore the stamp of a commentary of the political reform-related events currently occurring in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Palestine. As such it is of considerable interest in demonstrating the sensitivity of the organization to the language and the political vocabulary of the moment. Sensing the threat of potential change being conducted without reference to al-Qaeda's vision of reform, the organization's number two Ayman al-Zawahiri was at pains to downplay the possibility of reform by peaceful means ("Reform and expelling the invaders from the countries of Islam will not happen except through fighting for God's sake"). In a clear reference to recent scenes in Lebanon and Egypt (the May 25 referendum demonstrations in Cairo are directly alluded to), al-Zawahiri insists that "expelling the marauder Crusader and Jewish forces cannot be done through demonstrations and hoarse voices". He also warned the Palestinians (here referring to Hamas and Islamic Jihad) against being "dragged into the secularists' election game under a secular constitution." Though essentially a familiar call to maintain the culture of violent jihad' al-Zawahiri's presentation of an alternative program for reform adopts the watchwords of the reformists to make his point. ‘True reform,' according to Al-Zawahiri, has to be based on three premises: · Hakimiyyat al-Shari'ah (The rule of Islamic law) The use of the language of ‘freedom' is not a natural constituent of al-Qaeda ideology, a point which is made in an interesting analysis in the June 18 edition of the pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat. Here the commentator Mushari al-Dhayidi notes how the three premises are low in substance, but are carefully phrased to highlight terms which happen to be relevant to the present political climate [www.aawsat.com]. The point is illustrated by looking at the previous sound recordings sent to Arabic satellite channels. On February 22 al-Zawahiri focused his talk on the Guantanamo scandal as a means of pouring scorn on U.S. claims to democratic freedoms (but where no criticism was implied on the concept of freedom and democracy as such). In an earlier recording made on November 29, 2004, bin Laden delivered a text focused on the pragmatic advantages of the United States working with the Islamic world in a way that would serve their mutual interests. Conspicuously absent was the language of "permanent jihad until all sovereignty on Earth belongs to God alone" where mutual interests are irrelevant. Earlier, in June 2004, al-Zawahiri took issue with the ‘Reform Summit' at Tunis and its agreement to promote Washington's program for democracy in the Middle East, as being "of no advantage to the Arab world." Both the timing of these transmissions, and their vocabulary, serve to underline – in strategic terms – how al-Qaeda is increasingly being forced to operate within, and as a response to, political realities, instead of re-defining them. With each transmission there appears evidence of al-Qaeda's fear of the argumentation of reform, the organization's distrust of its own ideological pull — when openly stated — and its fears of increasing marginalization from the political debate. One footnote to the latest recording is also worthy of interest. In the course of the video communiqué, Zawahiri launched an unprecedented attack on the Sudanese government. According to the Sudan Tribune, quoting Hani al-Siba'i the director of Al-Maqrizi Research Centre in London, the cause of the invective was Khartoum's handing over of "files with photographs for most of the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Jihad" who up to 1995 were based in the Sudanese capital. Bin Laden moved to Sudan after being expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991 for his anti-government activities, as a result of Riyadh's decision to admit U.S. troops on Saudi soil in order to reverse Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Bin Laden worked with other exiled radical groups in Sudan until 1995, when he decamped to Afghanistan, after Khartoum expelled him under pressure from the United States. While, according to Al-Siba'i, the leadership at the time used fictitious names or forged passports for security reasons, "the Sudanese government knew their identities by virtue of a special agreement between the security bodies and the leaders of the Islamic groups" [www.sudantribune.com]. Al-Zawahiri's sensitivity to the documents may give some indication of their continuing value. Indonesia braces for more terror attacks Judging from the nervous reports emanating from U.S. and Australian advisories, Indonesia is bracing itself for an imminent renewed cycle of anti-Western bomb attacks. "We continue to receive a stream of credible reporting" the Australian advisory posted on June 10 suggesting that terrorists are in the very advanced stages of planning attacks in Indonesia" [www.smarttraveller.gov.au]. It followed an earlier warning from the U.S. embassy in Jakarta advising Americans to be prepared as of June 1 for an attack expected around noon on an unspecified date, as part of a strategy by extremists to "conduct bomb attacks targeting the lobbies of hotels frequented by Westerners" [www.usembassyjakarta.org]. Indonesian police continue their warnings of the imminent strike by two key members of the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, the Malaysians Noordin Top and Azahari bin Husin. These were part of the group responsible for a number of attacks in Indonesia, including the October 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta, and the 2004 bomb outside the Australian embassy. The tally of fatalities of these bombings totaled 234. "According to our intelligence feedback" Indonesian police chief Da'i Bachtiar stated, as reported in the daily Media Indonesia, "terrorists Azahari and Noordin are now in Jakarta and ready to blow up their targets after failing to do so in May" [www.mediaindo.co.id]. The two Malaysians are believed to be in the vicinity of Jakarta recruiting followers for their next operation. The security authorities do appear to be being tested. According to the Indonesian daily Koran Tempo, quoting a military communiqué, Indonesian soldiers on June 13 were hunting in West Java for five cars believed to be carrying bombs made by recruits of Noordin Top [www.korantempo.com]. Two days later came the report that Indonesian police had found a partly assembled explosive device at a south Jakarta train station [www.alertnet.org]. That Indonesia is likely to face a threat from increasingly sophisticated terrorism comes from the results of investigations into a recent armed attack on a mobile brigade post in Indonesia's eastern province of Maluku (see Focus II, issue 10). State run news agency Antara reported that evidence from the capture and interrogation of several suspects involved indicate that the planners came from outside Maluku province (although they used "local people in carrying out their missions") and was not simply a product of local communal tensions. The attack was mounted by highly trained guerrillas, who were allegedly part of a network responsible for a series of violent incidents in the provincial capital of Ambon, and who evidenced links with al-Qaeda [www.antara.co.id]. The same diagnosis — outside agents provocateurs aiming to stir up communal violence — has been made for the serious event of May 28 when twin bomb attacks on a market in Tentena, Central Sulawesi killed 22 and injured 50, the deadliest terror attack in Indonesia since the 2002 Bali bombings. So far the finger is pointing at Jemaah Islamiya, or at least local groupings inspired by Jemaah Islamiyah's agenda. The site for igniting tension is well chosen, since Tentena lies in an area that witnessed three years of Muslim-Christian fighting which, up until a peace agreement in late 2001, accounted for 2,000 fatalities [www.thejakartapost.com]. IN-DEPTH "The Pious Caliphate Will Start >From Afghanistan": Is al-Qaeda's Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding? By Michael Scheuer Amid Pakistani President's Musharraf's claims that al-Qaeda's "back is broken," and those by U.S. officials that Al-Qaeda is focused on Iraq, the Arabic daily Al-Quds al-Arabi has described "a noticeable increase in the attacks on U.S. forces in various parts of Afghanistan." Explanations for the attacks range from better weather, Pakistani interference in Afghan affairs; and increased aid to the insurgents from "regional powers." This article examines these claims, assesses their validity, and suggests a fourth cause for the violence -- that al-Qaeda is simply pursuing its long-term Afghan strategy. Rites of Spring, Pakistani Designs, and Foreign Conspiracies? The jump in violence in Afghanistan is being been attributed to several factors. Senior Coalition officials say the spike was "predictable" after the spring thaw. U.S. General Eric Olson minimized the threat posed by the attacks, saying they "lack cohesion" and will "fade [even] in traditional Taliban strongholds." [1] Perhaps hedging their bets, Coalition military officials followed Olson's analysis by announcing that two-to-five thousand more NATO troops would deploy to Afghanistan later in 2005. Departing U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, on the other hand, said on 18 June that the attacks in Afghanistan are directed from abroad because Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar are not in Afghanistan. (4) Khalilzad did not say where the two men are, but none-too-subtly pointed to Pakistan. "If GEO [Television] can get in touch with them [Taleban leaders]," Khalilzad said, "how can the intelligence service of a country which has nuclear bombs and a lot of military and security forces, not find them?" [2] Simultaneously, senior Afghan scholar Morab Boresh and presidential spokesman Jafar Rasuli excoriated Pakistan. "The Pakistanis will never stop interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs," Baresh told Kabul‘s Tolu Television. "We still have Pakistani elements within our own [Afghan] government… I do not know when they will stop [interfering]" On 20 June, DCI Porter Goss also hinted that bin Laden and Omar are in Pakistan. [3] Other Afghan officials saw multiple foreign hands at work. President Karzai, for example, said the violence was caused by an external "conspiracy [that] will increase against our country" as parliamentary elections near. [4] "It looks," Defense Minister Rahim Wardak added, "like there has been a regrouping of al-Qaeda, and [that] they have changed their tactics to concentrate on Iraq, but Afghanistan too." [5] Wardak and Karzai's spokesman Jawid Luran also claimed "foreigners" and "regional powers" were promoting the attacks through increased support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Luran said the killing of pro-Karzai cleric Mullah Fayyaz and the bombing of a U.S. Reconstruction Team's base -- both in Qandahar Province -- was the work of non-Afghan "terrorists." [6] Qandahar governor Gul Agha Shurzai supported this judgment. After the bombing of the mosque conducting Fayyaz's funeral, Shurzai said police "found documents on the [bomber's] body that showed he was an Arab." Shirazi said this proved "Arab al-Qaeda teams had entered Afghanistan and had planned terrorist attacks." [7] Al-Qaeda: Staying its Course in Afghanistan Each of these contentions contains some truth. That said, the increased violence is mainly due to Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents having emerged relatively unscathed from the deadliest period of Coalition military activity, October 2001-March 2002. They have since regrouped, reinforced, retrained, and rearmed. They also benefited from a two-plus-year respite resulting from the Coalition keeping its conventional units in garrison and chasing the insurgents only with Special Forces and intelligence officers. The Taliban acknowledged this respite in May 2005 when it posted "night letters" condemning Karzai for giving the U.S. permanent bases and seeking a "strategic partnership" with Washington. The letters told Afghans that "the principle duty of the mujahideen [e.g., fighting infidels] has just started." [8] The recent attacks fit bin Laden's strategic goal of ensuring "the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan." [9] In 1998, bin Laden pledged personal loyalty to Mullah Omar, describing him as "our chief" and "the legitimate ruler of the state of Afghanistan … [the] embodiment of Islamic respect." [10] These facts are downplayed by Western leaders who say bin Laden was paying lip service to Omar and that al-Qaeda is now solely focused on the jihad in Iraq. No one, however, should doubt bin Laden's resolve to help retake Afghanistan for Mullah Omar. In June 2000, Bin Laden stressed Afghanistan's central place in al-Qaeda's strategy" "Any aggression by the United States today against Afghanistan would not be against Afghanistan itself, but against the Afghanistan that hoists the banner of Islam in the world, the true, mujahid Islam, which fights for the sake of God… Allah has blessed Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan… They were able to unify the country under the Taliban and under the leadership of Amir ul-Mu'mineen [Commander of the Faithful] Mulanna [our Mullah] Omar. So today, Afghanistan is the only country in the world that has the Shari'ah. Therefore, it is compulsory upon Muslims all over the world to help Afghanistan. And to make hijra to this land, because it is from this land that we will dispatch our armies to smash all kuffar all over the world." [11] Time and setbacks have not dulled bin Laden's resolve. After the 9/11 attacks, for example, bin Ladin said Afghanistan would be the site of "one of Islam's immortal battles." [12] "[U]nder the leadership of our mujahid Amir … Mullah Muhammad Omar," bin Laden wrote, "we are firm on the path of jihad for the cause of God." Bin Laden said Omar knew "the United States was not against me. It was not even against the Taliban. It was against Islam." [13] In late 2004, bin Laden again stressed the Afghans' courageous hospitality and the strategic importance of restoring Taliban rule. He used poetry, which he employs for topics of great importance, to assert that Allah had made Afghanistan "a door of sustenance" for all Muslims: "The love of Hijaz is deep in my heart. But the rulers there are wolves. In Afghanistan, I have a home and companions. And from Allah comes a door for sustenance. Like friends, horses are few. Even if they appear many, in the eyes of the inexperienced. And anyone who appreciates kindness is loved. And any place where glory is home grown, is blessed." [14] Consistent with al-Qaeda's tactical doctrine for aiding Islamist insurgencies, Taliban leaders are taking the lead in discussing and claiming credit for the increased violence. Al-Qaeda's doctrine is clear: Support the insurgents fully and offer advice, but stay in the background, do not dictate, and allow local leaders to run operations as they see fit. Thus, on 15 June 2005, senior Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Usmani told GEO Television about the state of the Afghan insurgency. Usmani said bin Laden was, "thanks be to God … absolutely fine, in good health and fit," but said no more about him. Usmani, who was charged in 2003 with reorganizing Taliban forces, then moved to Omar, calling him "our leader and chief," asserting that "no one [in the Taliban] is against him," and saying Omar instructs him regularly by telephone. Usmani also said the Taliban is reorganized and it, "is in all areas [of Afghanistan]. In some areas, it is working more; in some areas, it is working less. However, it is present and working in all provinces… Almost 80 percent of the [Afghan] people are with us; they were not in the past, but now they are because when they consider U.S. atrocities and actions, they come to understand the United States is their enemy… Now our fighting is increasing. It may increase manifold this year... We also have weapons. We do not need anything. [15] Conclusion It is not yet clear that the increased insurgent attacks in Afghanistan are the start of a sustainable, al-Qaeda-backed, Taliban-led offensive. The attacks, however, fit al-Qaeda's strategic goal of returning Mullah Omar‘s to power, and its tactical policy of helping the insurgents while leaving them in charge and in the spotlight. For now, al-Qaeda's main contributions are its public fealty to Omar and provision of Arab suicide bombers which -- if used in numbers similar to Iraq -- would present an unprecedented challenge to the Coalition. Finally, Taliban and al-Qaeda military efforts are being augmented by what Al-Quds al-Arabi described as "conditions in Afghanistan [which] are deteriorating at a terrifying speed and returning to the state of chaos similar to the one that prevailed before [the] Taleban took over power…." This, at day's end, is the insurgents' strongest ally, and one the Coalition can do little to defeat without country-wide military operations and massive infusions of economic aid. Michael Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He served as the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the once anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror and Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America. Notes 1. Amin Tarzai and Kathleen Ridalfo, "Arab Boost for Afghan Resistance," Asia Times, 61 June 2005 2. "Interview of Zalmay Khalilzad," GEO Television [Dubai], 18 June 2005 3. Tolu Television [Kabul], 16 June 2005. 4. Sayed Salahuddin, "Afghan leader predicts violence as NATO pledges troops," Reuters, 15 June 2005. 5. Paul Haven, "Afghan minister says al-Qaeda regroups," Associated Press, 17 June 2005 6. Ibid. and "Problems in Afghanistan Emanate Abroad," Eslah [Kabul], 16 June 2005. 7. Amin Tarzai and Kathleen Ridalfo, "Arab Boost for Afghan Resistance," Asia Times, 61 June 2005. 8. Ibid. 9. Mufti Jamal Khan, "Bin Ladin: Expel Jews, Christians from Holy Places," Jang [Pakistan], 18 November 1998. 10. "Hero of Modern Times," The Nation, Lahore Edition (Internet version), 21 August 1998. 11. "Usama Speaks on Hijrah and the Islamic State," Al-Jihaad Newsletter, Issue No. 4, 22 June 2000. 12. "Letter by Usama Bin Ladin to the Pakistani People," Al-Jazeera
TV, 24 September 2001. http://www.jamestown.org Terrorism Focus is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. It is researched and edited by Stephen Ulph, a specialist in economic and political developments of the Middle East and North Africa. He is the founder and editor of the Terrorism Security Monitor and editor and analyst of Islamic Affairs for Jane's Information Group. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the Terrorism Focus, please contact the publications coordinator at pubs@jamestown.org. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly prohibited by law. The Jamestown Foundation Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation. |
