US Warns Egypt and Israel of Al Qaeda Threat: Chemical or Marine Terror

US Warns Egypt and Israel of Al Qaeda Threat: Chemical or Marine Terror
Possible

From DEBKA-Net-Weekly 185 Updated by DEBKAfile

December 14, 2004, 10:50 PM (GMT+02:00)

At the beginning of December, Washington warned Jerusalem and Cairo of a
planned major al Qaeda attack in one of their cities - possibly even with
chemical weapons. In addition, the Americans and the British warned Israel
and Egypt to beware of large-scale maritime strikes in the Mediterranean,
Gulf of Aqaba, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal. One possible method is the
familiar one of suicides aboard speedboats crammed with explosives ramming
merchant vessels and oil tankers; but another way could be to hijack vessels
and scuttle them in the Suez Canal to block the international waterway. This
stratagem would create international havoc. Even if it failed, marine
insurance premiums in these waterways would rise and sea freight rates would
shoot up on the routes from China to the West.

Washington issued its warning after analyzing the October 7 al Qaeda attack
on three Sinai resorts in which 34 people died and its aftermath.

It was noted that Egyptian security has not managed to lay hands on al
Qaeda's Sinai Peninsula lair or prevent it from being strengthened in recent
weeks with a manpower infusion. DEBKAfile's counter-terror sources also
reveal that Saud Hamid al-Utaibi was appointed new al Qaeda commander in
Saudi Arabia largely thanks to his expertise in marine terror. His
experience includes an active role in blowing up the USS Cole in October
2000 and in holing the French Limburg tanker two years later; both rammed by
exploding speedboats in Yemeni waters.

All three attacks took place in October.

Al-Utaibi's exceptional operational capabilities stood out in his latest
operation on dry land - namely against the December 6 raid on the US
consulate in the Red Sea town of Jeddah. It owed its success as much to its
military precision and accurate inside and undercover work, as to the large
gaps in Saudi intelligence.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly 185 described the attack in detail:

The fundamentalist terror group timed its first operation for the absence
overseas of Prince Nayef. Its planners figured correctly that without his
commanding presence and firm hand, Saudi security forces' responses would be
slow and indecisive.

American and Saudi security units at one of the most heavily guarded US
facilities in the kingdom were in fact caught napping. Saudi special
operations units were dropped by helicopter at the consulate more than one
hour, 20 minutes, after the attack began at 11.30 a.m. They would have
arrived faster by road, but feared al Qaeda ambush squads would waylay them
on the approach roads to the scene of attack.

While some details are sketchy because of the Saudi blackout on the
investigation, there is no concealing that this was one of al Qaeda's most
audacious daytime strikes.

The assailants reached the scene in three tightly-coordinated bands of
between 8 and 12 men - all in Saudi army uniforms carrying standard issue
Saudi weapons. They drove up in one or two explosives-packed vehicle - or
vehicles - painted with Saudi military colors. This truck or convoy was
waved unquestioningly through all three Saudi security checkpoints
positioned on the road approaching the consulate. This alone has led the
investigation to presume inside help.

They then operated at speed with clockwork precision

The first group used a truck to drive directly to the gate on the eastern
wall leading into the visa, immigration and public services department. They
waited for the gate to open for a departing car and then burst in spraying
automatic weapons fire and hurling hand grenades. The guards manning the
watchtower at this gate fled before sounding the alarm, leaving the
attackers in control.

At this point, the ongoing assault had still not registered with the
Americans in the building and the Saudis outside the facility, despite the
surveillance cameras at the watchtowers and gates. However, at that moment,
the second group blew up the same truck - or a second vehicle - at the main
gate. This was the signal for the third band to blow a big hole in the
17-foot high western perimeter wall with dozens of kilos of explosives and
burst in to link up with the first group.

The large crater at the main gate prevented consulate staff from escaping;
the blast distracted attention from the two groups of intruders.

Once through the perimeter walls, the terrorists appear to have known their
way about well enough to shut down the consulate's electronic surveillance
systems, before storming the building.

By then, the American staff had been alerted and evacuated to vault-like
security rooms sealed off by reinforced steel doors. With no chance of
breaking through, the raiders climbed up to the consulate's roof, where they
lowered the American flag and burned it. There were no armed guards to stop
them as they went through the building, room by room, collecting documents -
some of them top secret, before setting the offices on fire. Only then did
the Saudi helicopters carrying the commandos appear overhead, albeit high up
and out of range of possible ground fire.

At least one feature of the Jeddah consulate assault plan recalls al Qaeda's
modus operandi in its May 29 strike against foreign oil company offices in
Khobar. Then, when Saudi commando helicopters put down on the roofs of
captured buildings, the terrorists cut off the heads of eight or nine
non-Muslim hostages they had seized. They then made off ahead of capture.

In Jeddah, the terrorists simply shot dead in cold blood eight of the people
waiting in line for US visas - and ran. The bodies of three attackers were
later found in the compound, two more were injured and taken alive. One died
later.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's counter-terrorism sources challenge the official estimate
of five assailants for this precisely-plotted operation. It glosses over the
escape of four or five terrorists and leaves unanswered the question of how
they escaped safely through the cordon of some 200 Saudi police and security
officers surrounding the building. Once again, inside connivance with al
Qaeda is indicated.

Two further questions stand out:

1. Who passed the attackers sensitive data on the locations of the mission's
security and surveillance equipment and the vulnerable gaps in its security
system? Aside from the "safe rooms" that saved the lives of the American
personnel, al Qaeda had been briefed on the exact points of the building's
electronic control centers and the keys to disarming them. Security experts
fear that for their next raid of a US diplomatic facility, al Qaeda will
have acquired additionally the codes for penetrating the terrorist-proof
"Americans-only" shelters inside the building.

2. How was an armed "military" convoy able to move unchallenged through
Jeddah's downtown business district - Saudi Arabia's economic heartland --
at a particularly tense time when the kingdom's security and intelligence
services were on high alert?

3. Looking at al Qaeda's Jeddah consulate attack and the December 12
Palestinian Rafah tunnel blast (See opposite column) six days later, experts
on terrorist tactics are gaining the impression that Islamic and Arab
terrorist organizations are beginning to move away from the lone suicide
bomber format; they seem to be advancing toward deploying larger operational
units using standard military methods as well as applying superior
intelligence to gain the great advantage of surprise