Attack in Saudi Arabia: The Missing Second Cell?

Attack in Saudi Arabia: The Missing Second Cell?
Dec 16, 2004 1810 GMT

Stratfor has learned from reliable counterterrorism sources that the Dec. 6
attack against the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was intended to
be far more complex. As the attack played out, five gunmen entered the
compound's outer wall through a gate that opened to allow a vehicle to pass,
and then engaged Saudi and U.S. security forces in sporadic gunbattles.
Ultimately the attack failed
<http://web2.stratfor.com/news/2004TER/Story.neo?storyId=240450> because
the gunmen were unable to penetrate consular security.

Inner circles of the intelligence and security community now theorize that a
second cell was to have attacked the compound from the rear, but that the
cell somehow was disrupted a week or so prior to the attack. The five-member
cell that staged the unsuccessful attack apparently never knew it was
supposed to have backup. This suggests that a high degree of operational
security is built into al Qaeda's structure in the kingdom.

Furthermore, this new information offers a chilling insight into the likely
outcome of this attack had the second cell also stormed the compound.

Stratfor is uncertain when the second cell was intercepted. Sources within
the U.S. government point to Nov. 9 and Nov. 22 shootouts in the kingdom as
possibilities, although the Nov. 27 death of a suspected militant in Jeddah
is another possibility. Had this cell made it into the compound, the Dec. 6
attack could have had far more dire consequences.

Rather than a small team of men trying to storm its way through security,
two teams attacking from opposite flanks would have been far more difficult
to engage. Preparing for an attack of this magnitude would require a
security force -- and the equipment that goes hand in hand with it -- at
least twice as large as the force currently in place at the consulate.
Additionally, evacuation procedures would have to take into account the
possibility of a multi-directional assault.

Considering the design of the compound and the quality of U.S. Marines and
Saudi security guards in place at the consulate, this operation likely would
have failed in any event. Had a plan of this sophistication been set into
motion in a less secure compound -- a private Western housing or office
compound, or a hotel -- the results could have been disastrous.

Because the Dec. 6 attack team lacked the means to breach security at the
consulate building itself, Stratfor now believes this was the job of the
second, larger team. This could explain why the first team was so poorly
equipped to deal with the heavy physical security measures it encountered.
Stratfor earlier had deemed this as an intelligence failure, saying the
militants were unaware of the strength of security they would encounter once
inside the compound. The existence of a second team raises the possibility
that the intelligence was not as shoddy as initially suspected, but that the
main assault force assigned to deal with the heaviest layer security never
showed up.

The team that did strike reportedly was equipped with handcuffs, machetes
and video recording equipment, suggesting the operation was intended as a
hostage/execution siege against the compound -- similar in design perhaps to
the school siege in Beslan, Russia.

As a result of the attacks against Western compounds in Yanbu and Khobar,
Saudi Arabia, in early summer, security and awareness have been increased at
similar compounds throughout the kingdom. Evacuation procedures and
well-trained security guards, for instance, are in place. In light of this
latest attack, however, we have to wonder whether enough has been done.
Creating a defensive perimeter within a compound in order to lock down a
small group of attackers is not incredibly difficult. Should that layer of
defense be forced to defend multiple flanks, however, the odds suddenly
shift heavily in favor of the militants.

If this double-sided attack theory is true, it sheds further light on al
Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Ensuring that the two cells were unaware of one
another is a surefire way to protect the security of the operation -- and of
the network. Additionally, the possibility that the overall leader of this
operation failed to call off the attack after one cell was disrupted
strongly suggests that al Qaeda militants are trained to follow the last
standing order from their commander. This means that even if a leader is
arrested or killed, an attack already in the operational stage will proceed
on schedule