TERRORISM MONITOR

TERRORISM MONITOR: In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror
16 December 2004 - Volume II, Issue 24
The Jamestown Foundation

IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE ON ZARQAWI:
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch
By Gary Gambill
- Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to al-Qaeda: From Mu'askar al-Battar, Issue
21
Translated by Jeffrey Pool
- Unraveling Zarqawi's al-Qaeda Connection
By Gordon Corera
- Zarqawi's Jordanian Agenda
By Matthew Levitt and Julie Sawyer
- Ricin Fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge
By Andrew McGregor

Editor's Note on Special Issue on Zarqawi:

Originally a gangster with a drug habit and propensity for sexual assault,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is an unlikely Salafist militant. His murky origins,
combined with his sudden projection into the limelight on the eve of the
invasion of Iraq and the grisly exploits of his organization in that country
have ensured that much of the information on the man and his organization
are often inaccurate or misleading. This special is designed to provide
timely and accurate information and analysis on the man who is increasingly
touted as the United States' most dangerous adversary in Iraq. The range of
articles presented here discuss and assess a number of acutely relevant
topics; including Zarqawi's background, the precise nature of his
relationship with al-Qaeda, enmity towards the Jordanian regime and the more
eccentric misinformation campaigns that have centered on him. It also
becomes apparent, throughout this collection of articles, that Zarqawi's
Achilles' heel truly is his lack of vision and the weak ideology
underpinning his operations.

_____

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch

By Gary Gambill

In the span of just eighteen months, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged from
obscurity to eclipse Osama bin Laden as public enemy number one in the Bush
administration's war on terror. Less gifted than bin Laden in nearly every
way, Zarqawi rose to become the "emir" of radical Islamist terror groups in
Iraq largely on the strength of his networking skills. While probably not
the terrorist mastermind he is often made out to be, Zarqawi is responsible
for forging the broad outlines of a seemingly effective terrorist strategy
for derailing Iraq's postwar political transition.

Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah in October 1966 to a family
of modest means in the working class Jordanian town of Zarqa, 16 miles
northeast of Amman. Contrary to many Western media reports, he is not of
Palestinian descent - the Khalaylah clan is a branch of the Bani Hassan, a
large East Bank bedouin tribe loyal to Jordan's Hashemite royal family.
Zarqawi's father, a local mukhtar (mayor) and retired army officer, died in
1984, leaving his mother a small pension to raise six daughters and four
sons.

Devastated by the death of his father, the seventeen-year-old adolescent
dropped out of school and descended into a life of drinking, drug abuse, and
violence on the streets of Zarqa. He soon ran afoul of the authorities and
was jailed for drug possession and sexual assault. Ironically, it was
probably his criminal activities that first drew him into the city's abject
and lawless Palestinian refugee camp, where he was exposed to radical
Salafist preachers. He quickly fell under their influence and gave up drugs
and alcohol. After acquiring a clerical job in the local municipality, he
married one of his maternal cousins.

In 1989, however, Zarqawi abruptly left his family to go to Afghanistan. By
this time, Soviet troops had already pulled out of the country - evidently
he was expecting to join a triumphant march on Kabul and witness the
establishment of the world's first Sunni Islamist state. Instead, he saw the
Mujahideen front fragment along tribal and ethnic lines, unable to deliver
the coup de grace to the "godless" Soviet-installed regime in Kabul for
three years. Zarqawi is believed to have taken part in some fighting, but he
mainly worked as a correspondent for a radical Islamist magazine during this
period. By 1991, he was spending most of his time in Peshawar, Pakistan -
once a way station for Arab volunteers going to Afghanistan, now teeming
with disillusioned Arab fighters debating what to do next.

It is here that Zarqawi came under the influence of Muhammad al-Maqdisi (aka
Issam al-Barqawi), a well-known radical Salafist thinker and fellow
Jordanian. Together they established a network called Bayat al-Imam to
organize Jordanian Afghan veterans. After the fall of Kabul in 1992, as
rival Mujahideen commanders finally "liberated" the Afghan capital only to
turn their guns on each other and tear the city to shreds, Zarqawi and
Maqdisi returned to Jordan to prepare for a jihad closer to home.

One thing that Zarqawi had not learned from Afghanistan's swaggering militia
environment was how to operate discretely. Upon his return, he began
publicly condemning the government and denouncing mainstream clerics who
supported it - a bad idea made worse by the fact that he had been naively
stockpiling weapons and explosives in his own home. In March 1994, security
forces raided his house, discovered the arms cache and arrested him. Zarqawi
was brought before the state security court on charges of membership in an
illegal organization and weapons possession - a predicament that might not
have been so dire had he treated the court respectfully. He did not.
"[Zarqawi] handed me a written indictment. The first defendant in this bill
was the late His Majesty King Hussein and the second was me.I was expected
to inform the first defendant of the charges," recalls the judge who
presided over the trial. [1] Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years in jail with
hard labor and sent to Suwaqa prison, where he was soon joined by Maqdisi.

Maqdisi quickly established a loyal following among the prisoners, with
Zarqawi (who worked out incessantly with buckets of rocks) acting as his
enforcer. Over time, however, the focus of the prisoners' loyalty shifted
decidedly to Zarqawi and a power struggle erupted between the two. While
Maqdisi was far more respected as a spiritual leader than his disciple
(whose single greatest learned achievement was memorizing the Qur'an) and
his background earned him considerable sympathy from the predominantly
Palestinian prisoners, Zarqawi's military experience and courage in
confronting guards and rival prisoner factions were much more important
assets in a prison environment and he eventually became the group's
undisputed leader.

Zarqawi's leadership style blended authoritarian and compassionate
tendencies. He imposed strict rules on his disciples - they had to dress
identically (Afghan-style robes, beards, short hair, black head cloths),
could watch only news broadcasts on television, could read only books that
he pre-approved, and were not allowed to socialize with non-Islamist
prisoners or even speak to each other in his presence without permission.
However, stories also abound of Zarqawi's devotion to his followers. On one
occasion, he flew into a rage and attacked a guard who was beating one of
his disciples. He was "well-known for loving his brothers in God more than
his relatives," recalls one Jordanian Islamist who knew him well. [2] When
an Islamist whose legs had been blown off in a terror attack was brought to
the prison, Zarqawi personally bathed and took care of the new arrival.
Former friends and associates also remember him as very emotional and easily
moved to tears.

In May 1999, following the ascension of King Abdullah II, Zarqawi was
released as part of a sweeping amnesty. However, in a replay of Saudi and
Egyptian efforts to "export" their violent Islamist opposition, Jordanian
intelligence incessantly harassed Zarqawi and other newly released Islamist
detainees, preventing them from getting jobs or starting businesses. Several
months after his release, Zarqawi left the country and returned to Peshawar.
Interestingly, he brought his ailing mother with him in hopes that the
climate there would help her battle with leukemia. When his visa expired six
months later, however, he was arrested and ordered to leave the country.
While his mother flew back to Jordan, Zarqawi crossed the border into
Afghanistan for the first time in eight years.

Shortly after entering the country, Zarqawi met with bin Laden and other
al-Qaeda leaders in Kandahar and asked them for support in establishing a
terror network aimed at overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. It appears that
they assisted him substantially - by late 2000 he had established his own
training camp near Herat in Western Afghanistan, catering mainly to exiled
Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian Islamists in Europe. As his network
developed, Zarqawi abandoned his exclusive focus on overthrowing the
Jordanian monarchy - in part because some operatives refused to go back to
Jordan, preferring instead to plot attacks against Israel or Jewish targets
in Europe.

While Zarqawi's network - by this time known as al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
(Monotheism and Holy War) - was not completely independent of al-Qaeda, it
was clearly autonomous. Zarqawi's men "refused to march under the banner of
another individual or group," recalls Nu'man bin-Uthman, a Libyan Islamist
leader now living in London who was in contact with Zarqawi at the time. [3]
Zarqawi's choice of Herat as a base of operations was significant - it
allowed him to bypass Pakistani way stations into Afghanistan used by
al-Qaeda and instead create his own highly sophisticated "underground
railroad" to ferry operatives between Europe and Afghanistan through the
eastern Iranian city of Mashhad. According to the interrogations of captured
Tawhid operatives in Germany, the two networks' fundraising branches
competed with each other in Europe.

Zarqawi's Iranian connections paid off - in the aftermath of 9/11, he and
most of his operatives in Afghanistan were able to cross overland into Iran.
However, his efforts to resume operations there backfired. In February 2002,
three Tawhid operatives on a mission to carry out bomb attacks against
Israel were arrested crossing into Turkey from Iran; their interrogation
alerted Western intelligence agencies to Zarqawi's presence in the Islamic
Republic. Pressure on Iran to expel Zarqawi intensified in April after eight
Tawhid members were arrested in Germany for plotting terrorist attacks
against Jewish targets.

Weeks later, Zarqawi was obliged to relocate to a remote area of northern
Iraq controlled by the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam. A number of
Arab Islamists had already set up camp in the mountainous enclave and
Zarqawi quickly joined forces with them. Believing that an American invasion
to oust Saddam Hussein was inevitable, Zarqawi began preparing the
groundwork for the battle ahead. He spent a considerable part of the summer
in Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle of Iraq, apparently to establish
local support networks. Since Iran was no longer a reliable conduit for the
travel of Tawhid operatives, Zarqawi spent time in Syria setting up an
alternate route.

During or shortly before the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
Zarqawi returned to Iran, where he met with bin Laden's military chief,
Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi (Saif al-Adel), who asked him to coordinate the
entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq through Syria. Zarqawi readily agreed
and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow of Arab Islamists were infiltrating
Iraq via Syria. Although many of these foreign fighters were not members of
Tawhid, they became more or less dependent on Zarqawi's local contacts once
they entered the unfamiliar country. Moreover, given Tawhid's superior
intelligence gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid
operatives to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi's
lieutenants. Consequentially, Zarqawi came to be recognized as the regional
"emir" of Islamist terrorists in Iraq - without (until last month) having
sworn fealty to bin Laden.

In essence, Zarqawi has pursued a four-pronged terror strategy in Iraq. The
first track of this strategy is intended to pressure international actors
into rescinding their support for Iraq's American-led transition. The truck
bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 effectively ended
the UN involvement on the ground in Iraq; other targets have included the
Jordanian embassy in Baghdad (August 2003) and the headquarters of Italy's
paramilitary police headquarters in Nasiriyah.

The second is designed to deter Iraqis from supporting the US-led
transition. Zarqawi operatives have carried out numerous car bomb attacks on
police stations and recruitment centers, killing hundreds, and have
assassinated several leading Iraqi politicians.

The third is designed to obstruct Iraq's reconstruction by abducting and
beheading civilian contractors, humanitarian aid workers, and other
foreigners in Iraq and distributing the gruesome videos of their executions
over the Internet. Zarqawi's network pioneered this practice with the
execution in May of Nicholas Berg (who Zarqawi himself beheaded) and carried
out at least ten subsequent killings, while other al-Qaeda-linked groups are
believed responsible for another two dozen murders.

The fourth track of Zarqawi's strategy is the string of deadly car bomb
attacks outside Shiite mosques (most recently, Hamid al-Najar mosque in
Baghdad on December 3) that have killed hundreds of worshippers. These
attacks are not intended to punish or deter collaboration with the coalition
- they are deliberately indiscriminate. In his January 2004 letter to bin
Laden, Zarqawi explains their purpose: "Targeting and striking their
religious, political, and military symbols, will make them show their rage
against the Sunnis and bear their inner vengeance. If we succeed in dragging
them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are
fearful of destruction and death." [4]

While Zarqawi's brutal methods appeal to many radical Sunni Islamists, they
have begun to spark considerable controversy in the Arab world. Iraqi
insurgent leaders in Iraq frequently complain that Zarqawi's brutality has
detracted from international sympathy for their cause. The Association of
Muslim Scholars in Iraq has repeatedly condemned the beheading of foreign
hostages as a violation of Islamic law. [5] Zarqawi's defense -that the
Prophet Muhammad ordered the killing of prisoners after the Battle of Badr -
is not seen as very persuasive by most Islamic scholars. [6] Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, a well-known Egyptian cleric living in Qatar, has compared
Zarqawi to the ancient Kharijites, "who used to pray and fast all the time .
. . but read the Qur'an without understanding it." [7]

Zarqawi's mass murder of Shiites has puzzled many informed observers, since
he was suspected of having loose ties with Iranian intelligence until
recently and al-Qaeda has scrupulously avoided targeting Shi'as. Some
speculate that the poorly educated Zarqawi has been heavily influenced by
one of his close associates in Iraq, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Musab
al-Suri), a prominent Syrian-born radical Islamist ideologue known for his
rabid hatred of heterodox Islamic sects. Whether Zarqawi's wanton killing of
Shiites precludes cooperation with maverick Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada
al-Sadr is not entirely clear. Sadr, whose militia has battled coalition
forces off and on over the past year, appears reluctant to unequivocally
rule this out - his spokesman in Baghdad recently claimed that atrocities
attributed to Zarqawi are actually the work of Israeli intelligence. [8]

Gary C. Gambill, a political analyst for Freedom House and adjunct professor
at College of Mount Saint Vincent, has published widely on Lebanese and
Syrian affairs. He is the former editor of Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin.

Notes:
1. Documentary interview, LBCI Satellite TV (Beirut), 27 November 2004.
2. Documentary interview, Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 1 July 2004.
3. Al-Hayat (London), 8 November 2004.
4. Agence France Presse, 12 February 2004.
5. Interview with Muthanna Harith al-Dari, Al-Dustour (Amman), 2 November
2004.
6. Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 12 May 2004.
7. Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 3 October 2004.
8. Interview with Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji, Al-Manar TV (Beirut), 2 December
2004.

* * *

Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to al-Qaeda: From Mu'askar al-Battar, Issue
21

Translation by Jamestown Researcher Jeffrey Pool

Translator's Introduction: On October 17, 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his
Tawhid wal-Jihad organization issued an online statement pledging allegiance
to al-Qaeda and its commander, Sheikh Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda reprinted
and acknowledged the statement, responding favorably to the new development
in their online magazine Mu'askar al-Battar. The newly-affiliated group is
known as Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq),
and has already claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the
December 13 bombing at an entrance to Baghdad's Green Zone.

The bay'ah (oath of allegiance) has been deemed authentic by US military and
intelligence analysts, and was further reaffirmed by al-Qaeda's public
acknowledgement. For this reason, Jamestown has chosen to print a translated
version of the segment from al-Battar, in the interest of providing its
readership with primary material on key developments in global terror.

Osama bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri have endorsed and
praised Zarqawi and the Iraqi insurgency in the past, and Zarqawi has been
happy to acknowledge these remarks, while carefully maintaining his
subordinate role in the greater mission and demonstrating his willingness to
show loyalty. Many conclusions can be drawn from the text: firstly,
Zarqawi's oath challenges past perceptions of rivalry between his
organization and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Secondly, it demonstrates his
desire to establish himself as a key player in al-Qaeda's mission in Iraq.
Finally, the text serves as a recruiting statement for the Iraqi insurgency,
through the endorsement of al-Qaeda leadership.

* * *

"Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided." (Qur'an 3:103)

Praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of worlds, and let there be no
aggression except upon the oppressors; and peace and blessings be upon our
beloved Prophet Mohammed, son of Abdullah, and upon all his family and
companions.

It should bring great joy to the people of Islam, especially those on the
front lines, and it was with good tidings of support during this blessed
month that Tawhid wal-Jihad's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (God protect him)
and his followers announced their allegiance to the Sheikh al-Mujahideen of
our time, Abu Abdullah Osama bin Laden, God protect him.

God said the following: Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be
divided.

The order was given to unite the major jihadi organizations with their
counterparts in Iraq, and more significantly, the Jamaah Salafiyah united
with Tawhid wal-Jihad. Then this [newly unified] blessed group pledged
allegiance to mujahid commander Abu Abdullah [Osama bin Laden] (God protect
and help him).

This is undoubtedly an indication that victory is approaching, God willing,
and that it represents a return to the glorious past. We shall, with great
fury, instill fear in the enemies of Islam, who consider that through their
war in Iraq they have nearly uprooted Islam from its recent stronghold. For
this, we will turn [the war] into a hell for them.

The land of Babylon, as it is called by the Jews and their compatriots in
the extreme American right who perpetrate the war, is not the piece of cake
expected by the people. Rather, they wish a return to the year 2001, for
even though they suffered great losses, there is no doubt that those
resulting from the blessed [9/11] attacks are not on the scale of their
defeat in Iraq, God willing. They have thrown their weight around in this
Muslim land, deciding that it would be the cornerstone in their plan which
they named 'the Greater Middle East' in their effort to impose their infidel
democracy, transform the peoples of the region and uproot Islam [from it];
however God will shame them and forsake them, grace and praise be unto Him.

[...]

On a memorable, historic day in this holy month, Sunday the third of Ramadan
to be specific, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi- the known Islamic leader- pledged
allegiance to the mujahid sheikh Osama bin Laden, to hear and obey for
better or worse, and to the cause of jihad until all of Islam is in God's
service.

The Iraqi mujahideen issued a statement to this effect, reprinted here in
its entirety:

Praise be to God who has united the ranks of the mujahideen and disperses
the forces of the infidels, and praise be to God who said: "hold fast to the
rope of God and you shall not be divided". Blessings and peace be upon he
who, through God, united the hearts of believers, and who stood as a bulwark
in the face of the enemies of Islam (they are severe against disbelievers,
and merciful among themselves), and upon his family and companions, who
raised the sword of truth against the propagators of falsehood.

Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (God protect him) and the
al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue
between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore
them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the
strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two
rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and
overall mission.

With the appearance of Ramadan, the month of the gift of victories, Muslims
are compelled to join forces and be a stick in the eye of Islam's enemies.

[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its
soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh "Osama bin Laden" (in word and in
deed) and to jihad for the sake of God until there is no more discord [among
the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion turns toward God.

For we have heard the words of our Prophet, whom we believe and trust, (let
the world not succumb to baseness and depravity), and we have seen the
absurdity of today's political leaders. We are waiting in regard to his
final promise on succession:

"Prophethood will remain with you for as long as God wills it to remain,
then God will raise it up wherever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there
will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood remaining with
you for as long as God wills it to remain. Then, He will raise it up
whenever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there will be a reign of
violently oppressive rule [unjust Muslim kings] and it will remain as long
as God wills it. Then, there will be a reign of tyrannical rule and it will
remain for as long as God wills it to remain. Then God will raise it up
whenever He wills to raise it up. Finally there will be a caliphate that
follows the guidance of Prophethood."

By God, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we
would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us
something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are
to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates!

Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the
mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry ['there is no God but
the one God'], as the flag waves, raised by our newest heroes. Let us
cleanse all Muslim lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam
enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.

Thus ends the statement, and it reminds us of the Companions and of the
heroes of our great people, for this written message is like those from the
history of Islam. It returns us to the time of the Prophet (God bless him
and grant him salvation) and his Companions (may God be pleased with them),
and so for God's sake, carry on, O people of Jihad, and return to the people
of Islam their lost glory, doing that of which previous centuries were
incapable.

It is worth mentioning that this oath of allegiance caused frustration and
alarm among the American leadership. As one counter-terror official stated,
"it is certain that this is not a step forward toward American security, but
its effects thus far remain to be seen". A Pentagon official clarified that
the Army would attempt to restrict the means of distributing Zarqawi's
statement.

* * *

Unraveling Zarqawi's al-Qaeda Connection

By Gordon Corera

An October 17th statement posted on an Islamist website and published in
al-Qaeda's military journal Mu`askar al-Battar claiming to be from the
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) group led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi began
with a personal pledge of allegiance from Zarqawi and his fighters to Osama
bin Laden: "[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its
leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh "Osama bin
Laden"... Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (God protect
him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a
dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose
to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to
understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the
land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its
methods and overall mission." [1]

After this, JTJ began issuing statements of responsibility under its new
name Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq). At the
time, some Islamist circles expressed doubt about the statement's
authenticity suggesting that it was part of a US-inspired campaign to
associate the violence in Iraq with "international terrorism" rather than
"legitimate" nationalist insurgency. [2] But the identities of the posters
as well as the language and style indicated that the messages were from
Zarqawi's group. U.S. intelligence sources say they are confident of the
validity of the original pledge.

The statements marked a surprising twist in the long, complex and disputed
tale of Zarqawi's links with al-Qaeda. Few have doubted that there has been
contact, but the generally accepted view so far has been that Zarqawi
constructed his own parallel network which may have in some ways been in
competition, or at the very least independent of, al-Qaeda.

Historically, the links were limited. According to an interview in Al-Hayat
a former Afghan jihadist claims that Zarqawi was not a well-known or
significant fighter in Afghanistan during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
[3] He participated with a number of jihadi fighters in the battlefront at
Khost, where a number of Jordanians fought, but had no identifiable links to
al-Qaeda as it began to emerge.

After spending some time in a Jordanian prison, Zarqawi returned to
Afghanistan and subsequently established a training camp in the western city
of Herat. Though he apparently assembled 80 to 100 people, largely
Palestinians and Jordanians committed to jihad but with no formal name for
the group, there is not thought to have been any links to al-Qaeda at this
time. Evidence gathered from Shadi Abdullah, an Islamist arrested in Germany
in 2002, even points to competition between Zarqawi and bin Laden for
recruits during this period, though Zarqawi seemed far more focused on
overthrowing the Jordanian regime and recruited almost exclusively
Palestinians and Jordanians.

After the U.S. attacked the Taliban, Zarqawi moved first to Iran. He was
then pressured to move on and traveled just over the border into Iraqi
Kurdistan as the only available place for refuge. Here he developed links
with a new generation of Salifists who had not fought in the original Afghan
jihad, including Ansar al-Islam, which had established itself on the Iranian
border and taken control of a number of villages. Reports from militants
claim that Iran was concerned over their location and asked them to move
three miles from the border to avoid any direct contact between Iranians and
the Ansar forces. Jihadist fighters then flowed into Northern Iraq from
Afghanistan and Pakistan through Iran. [4]

In his February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council, the U.S.
Secretary of State described Zarqawi as "an associate and collaborator of
Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants." Although Secretary Powell was
careful not to call him a formal member of al-Qaeda, Zarqawi was depicted as
a key link in the evidence designed to outline an association between Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden. But firm evidence of strong links either way -
to Saddam on the one side and to al-Qaeda on the other - is largely absent.

Since the formal end of the Iraq war in April 2003, many of the most
high-profile attacks, in particular suicide bombings and kidnappings have
been attributed to Zarqawi's organization. But some question whether Zarqawi
is really as significant in organizing the insurgency as portrayed. It is
helpful for the U.S. to personalize the insurgency and emphasize the role of
foreign fighters because doing so provides a link to al-Qaeda while
obscuring the essentially "nationalist" character of the Iraqi insurgency.
For the Iraqi interim government it is also helpful to emphasize
international links because it diminishes the sense that there is a domestic
Sunni-led insurgency against the state and that Iraqis are willing to kill
each other.

Though Zarqawi and his fighters numerically make a small proportion of the
resistance (estimates run from 50 to 500), they exercise an exaggerated
degree of influence due to their coupling of extreme violence with an acute
understanding of the power of the media; tactics which have developed in
symmetry and through close observation of other international terrorist
groups including al-Qaeda and its offshoots in Saudi Arabia. Over the summer
of 2004 with Osama bin Laden yet to appear and Zarqawi carrying out
increasingly bloody and high profile attacks, some began to question whether
Zarqawi was beginning to rival or even succeed bin Laden.

So what explains the October 2004 pledge of loyalty? The message claims that
talks have been going on for eight months between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi which
encountered many interruptions as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad explained its
strategy before the final offer of loyalty. Zarqawi is alleged to have
sought al-Qaeda support in the past but without success. In January 2004, an
individual was captured carrying a 17-page letter on a CD thought to be
written by Zarqawi calling for help from al-Qaeda in fomenting a sectarian
war in Iraq. The implication was that Zarqawi's group was independent but
nonetheless looking for support as the tone was at once supplicatory but
also written as if from one equal to another.

The letter said that Zarqawi's group had "our backs to the sea, the enemy
before us" and "we do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you," but
instead seek to "work under your banner, comply with your orders." U.S.
officials said they believed al-Qaeda had rebuffed these advances but there
are some doubts over the provenance and authorship of the letter.

Various explanations have emerged for the October pledge. One senior U.S.
counter-terrorism official told the author in early November 2004 that it
may be a sign of weakness, a view which is supported by the January letter.
The view is based on the supposition that groups like Zarqawi's would prefer
to retain their independence and autonomy to enhance their maneuverability
and ability to attract recruits and funding. Any decision to associate
themselves with another group is thus indicative of internal and external
pressures. They argue that pressure on Fallujah as a base of operations and
sanctuary for Zarqawi forced him to reach out. Other Arab analysts contend
that Zarqawi was put under pressure by the growing al-Qaeda presence in Iraq
to subsume his organization under a broader movement.

Zarqawi is never described as a great thinker or religious ideologue. One of
those who knew him in prison said that he would attack other inmates with
his fists: "That's all he could do. He's not like bin Laden with ideas and
vision. He had no vision." Meanwhile, ideologically there is not a total
overlap between Zarqawi and bin Laden. Both clearly subscribe to jihadist
salafism, but Zarqawi's use of violence has been more extreme and graphic.
Historically, whilst bin Laden in the last decade has focused on the far
enemy of the United States, Zarqawi has focused on enemies nearer at hand
like the Jordanian regime and now the interim Iraqi government.

One Arab who claimed to have recently met with Zarqawi in Fallujah stated
that Zarqawi's purpose was to turn Iraq into a new base of operations to
carry out further attacks in the region. "Rescuing Jerusalem and the
neighboring countries will come only after the rise of an Islamic state from
which the youth will set out to liberate the neighboring areas," the
Islamist Arab told Al-Hayat. [5]

The legitimacy of attacking Muslims looks to be the greatest difference
between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi. In particular, Zarqawi has been more focused
on fomenting sectarian strife within Iraq by attacking the Shi'as. In an
April 2004 message on a website attributed to Zarqawi, he threatens to "kill
their [Shi'a] imams and cut off their heads" and describes the August 2003
killing of Ayatatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as a "generous act of God,"
as Hakim was "full of deception and hostility to the people of Islam." [6]

The problem for Zarqawi may be that the extreme levels of violence which he
uses could end up isolating him and his group. One former jihadist compared
him to the Algerian GIA in his willingness to engage in mass slaughter of
both personnel and civilians. In July, Arabic media reported Iraqi
intelligence sources saying that a number of factions of the Iraqi
resistance had cut their ties with Zarqawi because of the level of civilian
casualties he causes and because they saw him as a "terrorist" rather than
part of the "resistance." Whether this is a problem for al-Qaeda is
debatable, but the oath of loyalty to bin Laden could hurt Zarqawi because
it makes clear that his group - already led by a foreigner - has an al-Qaeda
dictated international agenda and is no longer acting in the exclusive
interest of Iraqis.

Observers believe Zarqawi's organization is certain to continue escalating
its violence as the January elections approach, hoping in particular to
exacerbate sectarian tensions by exploiting Sunni fears of Shi'a domination.
The ability of the elections to draw communities into the political process
may be the ultimate determinant of Zarqawi's durability, as his organization
requires networks of local support to survive. If a new government can gain
some legitimacy then that may well turn the tide against his group.

Gordon Corera is the BBC's Security Correspondent

Notes:
1. Translated by the Jamestown Foundation.
2. Diya Rashwan quoted in Al Quds al-Arabi, October 19, 2004
3. Al Hayat, London, November 8, 2004
4. Al Hayat, London, November 8, 2004
5. Al Hayat, London, September 10, 2004
6. Translated by BBC Monitoring.

* * *

Zarqawi's Jordanian Agenda

By Matthew Levitt and Julie Sawyer

Though most famous for funding and organizing suicide bombings and
beheadings in Iraq, Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah - aka Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi - has long assumed a leading role in terrorist operations in
other countries, including his native Jordan.

An East Banker and a member of the Bani Hassan tribe (one of the largest in
Jordan), Zarqawi is often denigrated as a "thug" by fellow Jordanians [1].
Even after spending several years in Afghanistan in his early twenties,
Zarqawi remained little more than a violent criminal until he met Abu
Mohammed Maqdisi, a radical Palestinian cleric and figurehead of the
militant Bayat al-Imam network in Jordan. In 1999, King Abdullah assumed the
throne and issued a general amnesty in which Zarqawi was freed. As of July
2004, Maqdisi remained in a Jordanian prison, convicted of trying to
overthrow the government and establishing an Islamic caliphate.

After his release, Zarqawi moved to Pakistan, and then Afghanistan where he
ran a training camp near Herat. After 9/11, he settled in northern Iraq
where he met up with Jordanians from his hometown of Zarqa and from the
Suwaqa prison and established a training camp tied to Ansar al-Islam.
Zarqawi has been affiliated with several groups, which over time have
coalesced into one large network. These include Jund al-Shams, Bayat
al-Imam, Ansar al-Islam, al-Tawhid, Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and most recently,
al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (Iraq).

At the turn of the millennium, Zarqawi was involved in a plot to target
hotels frequented by Jewish and American tourists in Amman during millennial
celebrations. Zarqawi is believed to be behind the failed assassination
attempt in February 2002 of Ali Bourjaq, a Jordanian secret-police official.
In October 2002, Zarqawi planned and facilitated the assassination of U.S.
diplomat Lawrence Foley in Amman. According to the indictment of captured
assassin, Salem Said Bin Sewid, Zarqawi snuck into Jordan to personally
recruit members of the cell. In April 2004, Zarqawi was convicted for his
role in the plot along with Libyan and Jordanian attackers and four others.

One of Zarqawi's most successful operations targeting Jordanian interests
was the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad in August 2003 - an
attack which killed at least fourteen people. While Jordanian officials
first maintained both in public statements and in an interview with the
author that Ahmed Chalabi or elements tied to him were responsible for the
attack, Jordanian authorities now believe Zarqawi was behind this plot. [2]

The most spectacular of Zarqawi's plots was foiled, but would have been
considered a mega-terror attack had it not been. In April 2004, Jordanian
officials announced they had thwarted a major plot to attack various
locations in Amman, targeting Jordanians and Americans. Zarqawi personally
recruited the cell's leader, Azmi Al Jayousi, a Jordanian of Palestinian
origin, along with several other Jordanians and Syrians. The cell's targets
included the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) Headquarters,
the Prime Ministry, and the U.S. Embassy in Amman. Hussein Sharif, one of
the operatives recruited by Jayousi, confessed that Jayousi told him that
the aim of the attack was to execute an operation that would "strike at
Jordan and the Hashemites, a war against the crusaders and infidels."

The operation as planned was audacious not only in its targets, but in the
scale of the intended attack. Jordanian authorities maintain that the twenty
tons of explosives intended for the multiple coordinated attacks contained
more than ninety-two chemicals and would have resulted not only in a large
explosion but a chemical cloud. Based on an analysis of the explosives that
were confiscated, Jordanian experts maintain that the bomb had the potential
to injure 160,000 people. [3]

Just as disconcerting is the fact that this attack was largely funded and
facilitated by a logistical support network operating out of Jordan and
Syria. For example, Haithem Omar Ibrahim, a Syrian member of the Zarqawi
network, entered Jordan via Iraq and arranged safe houses for the plotters
where they lived for several months while preparing the planned mega attack.
During this time, the cell manufactured 20 tons of explosives and organized
the logistics of the attacks.

Throughout, Jayousi remained in contact with Zarqawi by messengers, most of
whom traveled between Jordan and Iraq through Syria. One of Zarqawi's most
prominent aides, a Syrian named Suleiman Khaled Darwish, supervised this
communications channel, arranging for couriers to deliver messages, forged
passports and identity cards. Jordanian intelligence further discovered that
Zarqawi's network would often send couriers with messages written in
invisible ink on paper currency carried in their wallets. [4] Passing
messages on bills of small denominations raised no alarms since anyone
passing through the border would be expected to have a small amount of cash
on their person. Zarqawi also used these couriers to send large amounts of
money - presumed to have been raised in Europe and the Persian Gulf states -
to fund the operation. According to Jayousi, Zarqawi "started sending me
money through messengers, payments of ten and fifteen thousand, until I had
a total of about $170 thousand; I bought a large quantity of the material
with that money."

The Jayousi plot was not the only time messengers and money were smuggled
across the Syrian-Jordanian border. Facilitated by several key aides
residing in the country, Zarqawi has made Syria a springboard for his
activities both in Iraq and Jordan. Already in April 2003 Italian
prosecutors warned that "Syria has functioned as a hub for an al-Qaeda
network" linked to Zarqawi. The Italian investigation revealed that Zarqawi
operatives in Europe were acting at the instruction of superiors in and
around Damascus and Aleppo, including "Mullah Fuad" (described as the
"gatekeeper in Syria for volunteers intent on reaching Iraq"), "Abdullah,"
and "Abderrazak."

According to Jordanian intelligence, despite Zarqawi's connections to
al-Qaeda, his group has developed its own networks of operatives and sources
of funding and is not dependent on any external organization. Couriers
deliver money collected in Europe and Persian Gulf states, while cars are
bought in Jordan and sold or traded in Iraq. [5] Such was the case with
Bilal al-Hiyari, a Jordanian businessman sentenced in October 2004 to six
months in jail by Jordan's military court for raising funds to finance
Zarqawi's attacks in Iraq and Jordan. According to the indictment, in August
2003 al-Hiyari allegedly raised approximately $3,000 to buy a German-made
Opel car that was sent to Zarqawi in Iraq. Jordanian intelligence officials
explained that such schemes allow Zarqawi to move funds from Jordan and
other countries into Iraq, thus avoiding the risk of messengers being caught
at the border with large sums of money. [6]

Zarqawi's ambitions clearly extend beyond Iraq, and the implications for
Jordan are particularly chilling. Beyond Zarqawi's demonstrated interest in
targeting fellow Jordanians, he and his operatives have been definitively
linked to several other terrorist organizations that have implications for
Jordan's security.

In an interview with the authors, Jordanian officials recently revealed that
a number of Zarqawi operatives regularly visit Osbat al-Ansar's "base" in
Ain al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon known as a
hotbed of Islamic extremism. (For further information on Ain al-Hilweh, see
Terrorism Monitor, Issue 21, Nov. 4, 2004) The officials maintained that
these Zarqawi men meet with members of Osbat al-Ansar (designated as a
terrorist organization by the U.S. Treasury in March 2002) a small but
dangerous Sunni extremist group that Jordanian officials claim has planned
attacks on Western and Jordanian embassies in Beirut. [7]

Facing such threats, Jordan has developed a well-rounded counterterrorism
strategy combining both tactical and strategic measures. The raids and
arrests that thwarted the Jayousi plot are but one example of the country's
tactical counter-terrorism capability. Jordan's Special Forces'
counter-terrorism unit can boast of many such successes, including the
November 2002 arrest of a group of Islamists in the southern city of Maan
who had been terrorizing the population, carrying weapons and bombs in the
street, and setting fire to homes. In September 2003, Jordanian authorities
arrested the Jordanian militant Mohammad Shalabi, also known as Abu Sayyaf,
for plotting to carry out terrorist attacks against American targets in the
country, possessing explosives, inciting riots in Maan, and belonging to the
banned militant group Takfir wal-Hijra. According to Jordanian intelligence,
Abu Sayyaf was captured in northeast Jordan on his way to join Zarqawi in
Iraq. [8]

Strategically, Jordan is one of the few countries truly engaged in the
battle of ideas. As important as it is to conduct raids, make arrests, and
freeze terror funds, the war on terror also requires that countries deny
jihadists the ability to radicalize and deploy new recruits. In November
2004, during the holy month of Ramadan, Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al
Tamimi delivered a sermon during a religious ceremony in the presence of
King Abdullah II emphasizing tolerance, humanity, the true values of Islam
and rejecting extremism. Subsequently dubbed the "Amman Message," the
official statement proclaims: "On religious grounds, on moral grounds, we
denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism which is associated with
wrongful practices wherever they come from.These despotic attacks on human
life transgress the law of God, and we denounce them." [9] Jordan has called
for a regional Islamic conference sometime next year to discuss and endorse
the message. The Amman Message and the conference Jordan plans to host are
significant milestones in the battle of ideas. Such efforts are critical if
jihadists like Zarqawi are to be defeated. The alternative, allowing
jihadists to dominate the battle of ideas and recruit several new terrorists
for every one killed or captured, is a recipe for failure.

Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counterterrorism analyst, is a senior fellow
and Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. Julie Sawyer is a Research Assistant at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. The two authors just returned from a research trip to
Jordan and Israel.

Notes:
1. Author interview with Jordanian scholar, November 11, 2004.
2. Author interviews with Jordanian officials, September 11, 2003 and
November 11, 2004.
3. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
4. Author interview with Jordanian official, July 7, 2004.
5. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
6. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
7. Author interview, November 11, 2004.
8. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
9. "Jordan issues the 'Amman Message' on Islam.'" Embassy of Jordan -
Washington DC Press Release. November 9, 2004.

* * *

Ricin Fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge

By Andrew McGregor

With Russia once again threatening pre-emptive strikes on "terrorist"
installations in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, it seems timely to re-examine the
alleged activities of Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the region
several years ago. The Pankisi Gorge is a river valley about 34 km long in
north-eastern Georgia. It is home to about 10,000 Kists, belonging to the
same ethnic group as the Chechens and Ingush. After the outbreak of the
second Russo-Chechen war in 1999, eight thousand Chechen refugees joined the
Kists there. Arriving later were Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and
the survivors of the Battle of Komsomolskoye (site of a major Chechen
defeat). Gelayev chose to rebuild his forces in the Pankisi Gorge; with
Georgia engaged in a struggle with Russia over the breakaway provinces of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia there was little danger of extradition.

By 2002, unsubstantiated reports began to emerge of al-Qaeda leaders taking
refuge in the Gorge after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov even suggested Bin Laden himself might be in
the Pankisi Gorge. [1] Russia wished to focus international attention on the
Gorge, where Gelayev had built up a significant armed force of 800 Chechens,
together with about 80 international mujahideen, mostly Turks and Arabs.
Georgian authorities pretended to be ignorant of their presence, despite
having negotiated a deal to supply and arm Gelayev's force in return for a
little extra-curricular combat on behalf of Georgia in Abkhazia in 2001.

In his pre-Iraq invasion address to the United Nations Security Council
Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that "we know that Zarqawi's
colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya,
Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members
of Zarqawi's network said their goal was to kill Russians with toxins."
Powell emphasized the production of ricin as a major threat, and the
importance of Zarqawi as a master poisoner. Abu Atiya (Adnan Muhammad Sadik)
was named by Powell as the leader of al-Qaeda's Pankisi operations and part
of Zarqawi's network. In July 2002, there were reports that the CIA had
warned Turkish officials that Abu Atiya had sent chemical or biological
materials to Turkey for use in terrorist attacks.

Georgian raids started in February 2002, while the main security "crackdown"
in Pankisi was carefully timed to follow the September 2002 departure of
Gelayev's forces from Russian territory. At the end of the security sweep in
October, fifteen minor Arab militants were turned over to the U.S. The
operation marked the first deployment of Georgian graduates of the Train and
Equip program, a U.S. initiative to train a core professional army for
Georgia. No evidence of chemical labs was discovered, though Georgia
cautiously conceded that some militants in the Pankisi Gorge "may" have been
chemical weapons experts.

The Ricin Crisis

There seems little reason for Zarqawi to move to the Pankisi Gorge, which
makes a useful base for striking into Chechnya but is remote from Middle
Eastern operational environments. The languages in the region are unfamiliar
to most Arabs and the militants in Pankisi under the command of Ruslan
Gelayev were nearly all bound for Chechnya. Gelayev feuded constantly with
Islamist commanders in the Chechen resistance, and would be unlikely to have
taken orders from Arab Islamists. Indeed, the entire story conflicts with
the usual account of Zarqawi being wounded in Afghanistan and receiving
medical treatment in Baghdad before joining Ansar al-Islam in the north.

In the buildup to the Iraqi war in early 2003, dozens of North Africans
(mainly Algerians) were arrested in Britain, France and Spain on charges of
preparing ricin and other chemical weapons. Colin Powell and others
trumpeted the arrests as proof of the threat posed by the
Zarqawi-Chechen-Pankisi ricin network (which had now been expanded to
include the Ansar al-Islam of Kurdish northern Iraq).

French and British security officials were astounded by Powell's insistence
on February 12, 2003, that "the ricin that is bouncing around Europe now
originated in Iraq." With the Iraq invasion only weeks away, the source of
the ricin threat moved from Georgia to Iraq. In the UK charges were dropped
when government laboratories could find no trace of the poison in seized
material. In Spain all the suspects were released when the poisons turned
out to be bleach and detergent. In France, ricin samples were revealed to be
barley and wheat germ. [2]

Responding to the arrests in Britain and France, Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov stated that the suspects had been trained in Georgia's Pankisi
Gorge, where al-Qaeda laboratories were manufacturing ricin. Few bothered to
question why anyone would set up a ricin lab requiring large numbers of
castor beans for the production of even a tiny amount of purified ricin in a
region with no native castor plants.

The "Chechen Network"

French Judge Jean-Louis Brugiere (a leading anti-terrorism official) led the
attack against what came to be known as the "Chechen network" declaring that
"the Chechens are experts in chemical warfare. And Chechnya is closer to
Europe than Afghanistan." The "Chechen network" was curiously devoid of
Chechens: nearly all the suspects were Algerian. Despite the outcome of the
European cases, the myth of the ricin-producing "Chechen network" took hold.

Chechen Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov is the only Chechen leader who
appears to have taken an interest in chemical weapons, and is frequently
accused by the FSB of planning chemical operations against Russian troops.
In 2001, leading FSB officials cited "serious grounds for suspecting him to
be a CIA agent." [3] Last October, Chechen police discovered two kilograms
of mercury, which they claimed Chitigov intended to use to poison a water
intake facility.

By August 2002 reports were emerging that Ansar al-Islam were experimenting
on animals with aerosolized ricin under Zarqawi's direction. Aerosolization
is the only method of delivering lethal doses of ricin to large numbers of
people, but requires a great deal of specialized equipment and expertise,
certainly far beyond the limitations of a primitive lab. Ricin cannot be
absorbed through the skin and was abruptly dropped from most state weapons
programs as soon as the more lethal Sarin nerve gas was developed. Despite
its potency, no effective method has yet been devised for the mass
distribution of ricin. The weaponization of ricin is sufficiently complex
that it almost precludes such use by non-state parties.

Conclusion

There is no evidence that Zarqawi knows anything about the manufacture or
deployment of chemical and biological weapons. In the aftermath of the
Jordan bombing attempt in April, Zarqawi made his only known statement on
the use of chemical weapons, posted on http://alminbar.front.ru: "If we had
such a bomb - and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon - we would not
hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns." [4]

Jordan's King Abdullah II referred to Zarqawi as a "street thug" last July,
adding that the media had inflated Zarqawi's intelligence and skills to
create a larger threat. Jordanian security services claimed the attempted
attack was a chemical assault using nerve gas and blister agents, capable of
killing 80,000 people. No evidence was presented, and even Zarqawi refuted
the use of chemical agents in the plot. [5] Zarqawi's career has followed
the path of high-school dropout, failed video retailer, prisoner and gunman.
It is thus impossible to identify how or when Zarqawi became an expert in
chemistry.

The identification of a ricin-producing "Chechen network" under Zarqawi's
control developed because it was useful. In the media, every unproven
allegation "from un-named intelligence sources" was treated as
unquestionable evidence, each being used as proof of the last. This house of
cards was saluted by Britain, Russia, the U.S. and eventually even the
Georgians as it served to advance the interests of each. The British
government was trying to justify an unpopular decision to join the Iraq war,
and Russia was able to implicate Georgia in a Chechen-al-Qaeda network of
terror, invoking "the common cause" of the anti-terror coalition in support
of their methods in Chechnya. The U.S. trained Georgian troops essential for
the protection of the two new oil pipelines about to cross Georgia under the
cloak of counter-terrorist assistance, while using the Zarqawi chemical
threat to drum up support in the United Nations. [6]

Last month Russia claimed that Abu Atiya (together with Abu Hafs "Amjet" and
Abu Rabiya) commanded 200 Chechens and 30 Turkish "mercenaries" in Pankisi,
though there is no explanation of how Abu Atiya, who was arrested in
Azerbaijan in September 2003, has returned to action. [7] Georgia continues
to deny the presence of any Chechen or Arab militants in the Gorge, calling
Russian statements "a provocation." Meanwhile Abu Musab al-Zarqawi remains
central to the disinformation campaigns that obscure our understanding of
Islamist terrorism.

Dr. McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security Analysis in
Toronto, Canada.

Notes:
1. "FM: Bin Laden could be in Caucasus", Associated Press, Feb. 17, 2002.
2. "The strange case of the dangerous detergent" New Statesman, April 14,
2003, By Justin Webster, "Ricin scare in Paris is false alarm," AP, April
11, 2003.
3. Russian Public TV (ORT), Interview with Nicolai Patrushev and Aleksandr
Zdanovich, April 18, 2001 (BBC Monitoring, April 19, 2001).
4. Translation from "'Zarqawi tape' says non-chemical attack planned on
Jordanian intelligence", AFP, April 30, 2004.
5. "Al-Zarqawi denies the Jordanian version over the chemical attack", Arab
News, May 1, 2004,
<http://app.bronto.com/x/trackclick.php?id=6415703_2735db79_43395&url=http:/
/www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040501/2004050110.html>
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040501/2004050110.html.
6. Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.
7. Not to be confused with the late Abu Hafs al-Misri or Abu Hafs 'the
Mauritanian'.