This means that for slightly more than four years the United States
will be
governed by a president who will never run for political office again.
In
general, two-term presidents tend to be less interested in political
process
than in their place in history. They tend to become more aggressive
in
trying to complete their perceived missions, and less cautious in the
chances they take. Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton all
encountered serious problems in their second terms, most due to their
handling of problems they experienced in their first terms. Nixon had
Watergate, while Reagan was handling Central American issues and hostages.
Clinton wound up impeached for his handling of matters in his second
term.
Going further back in the century, Woodrow Wilson had the League of
Nations
fiasco in his second term, and Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to pack the
Supreme Court. Dwight Eisenhower alone, his place in history assured,
did
not suffer serious setbacks from misjudgments, unless you want to view
Sputnik, Yuri Gagarin and the shooting down of the U-2 over Soviet air
space
as personal failures.
Second-term presidents tend to look at re-election as vindication of
their
first-term policies and as a repudiation of their critics. They see
themselves as having fewer constraints placed on them, and they become
less
sensitive to political nuances.
Bush is an interesting case because he was not particularly sensitive
to
political nuance in his first term. It is difficult to remember a president
in his first term who was less constrained by political considerations
or
political consequences. For better or worse, Bush did not govern with
one
eye on public opinion polls. As we learned in the course of his term,
he was
not particularly flexible, even when he was running for re-election.
We
therefore need to imagine a George W. Bush who is not relatively, but
completely, indifferent to political nuance.
Add to this that his legacy is far from assured. Bush's presidency
will be
measured by one thing: Sept. 11 and his response to it. It is far from
clear
how history will judge him. There are many parts to the puzzle -- from
Iraq,
to homeland defense to Pakistan and so on. They are moving parts. For
Bush
to assure his legacy, he must bring the conflict to a successful conclusion
-- not easy for a conflict in which success remains unclear.
We therefore have two forces at work. First, second-term presidents
tend to
feel much greater freedom of action than first-term presidents -- and
tend
to take greater risks. Second, Bush enters his second term with greater
pressure on his legacy than most presidents have. Bush needs to make
something happen, he needs to get the war under control, and he does
not
have all that much time to do it. If he is to complete his task before
the
end of his second term, he needs to start acting right now. It is our
expectation that he will.
His re-election represents the first step. Globally, there was a perception
that Bush had blundered massively. There has also been a long-standing
myth
that the United States cannot stand its ground because casualties generate
decisive antiwar movements. In spite of the fact that Nixon buried George
McGovern in 1972, and followed with the Christmas bombing of Hanoi,
global
expectations have always been that events in Iraq would generate a massive
antiwar movement that would force Bush from office.
This expectation was first shaken by Sen. John Kerry's campaign. For
all his
criticism, Kerry did not campaign against the war. He campaigned against
Bush. This was explained in many circles as merely what Kerry had to
say to
get elected, and that after election his true colors would emerge. However,
to more sensitive ears, the fact that Kerry had to campaign as he did
in
order to have a hope of election was jarring. The antiwar vote was too
small
for the theory. With Bush's victory, one of the fundamental assumptions
about the United States went out the window. In spite of casualties
and
grievous errors, not only was there no antiwar candidate (save Ralph
Nader),
but Bush actually won the election.
This puts in motion two processes in the world. First, there is a major
rethinking of American staying power in the war going on. The assumption
of
a rapid conclusion of the Iraq campaign due to U.S. withdrawal is gone
--
and it is surprising just how many non-Americans believed this to be
a
likely scenario. The reassessment of the United States is accompanied
by the
realization that the United States will not only maintain its pressure
in
Iraq, but on the region and the globe itself.
American pressure is not insubstantial. Virtually every country in
the world
wants something from the United States, from a trade agreement to support
on
a local conflict. They can do without an accommodation with the United
States for months, but there is frequently serious pain associated with
being at odds with the United States for years. Throughout the world,
nations that have resisted U.S. actions in the war -- both within and
outside of the region -- must now consider whether they can resist for
years.
We can expect two things from Bush in general: relentlessness and linkage.
Having won the election, Bush is not going to abandon his goal of crushing
al Qaeda and pacifying Iraq and, indeed, the region. That is understood.
Equally understood is that Bush will reward friends. Bush's test of
friendship is
simple: support for the United States and, in particular, support for
the
policies being pursued by his administration in the war. For Bush, active
support for the war was a litmus test for good relations with the United
States during the first term. The second term will make the first term
look
gentle.
Countries that made the decision not to support Bush did so with the
assumption that they could absorb the cost for a while. They must now
recalculate to see if they can absorb the cost for four more years --
and
even beyond, if Bush's successor pursues his policies. For many countries,
what was a temporary disagreement is about to turn into a strategic
misalignment with the United States. Some countries will continue on
their
path, others will reconsider. There will be a reshuffling of the global
deck
in the coming months.
The same analysis being made in the world is also being made in Iraq.
There
are the guerrillas, most of whom are committed to fighting the United
States
to the death. But the guerrillas are not a massive force, and they depend
for their survival and operational capabilities on a supportive population.
In Iraq, support comes from the top down. It is the tribal elders, the
senior clergy and the village leaders who make the crucial decisions.
They
are the ones who decide whether there will be popular support or not.
There has been an assumption in Iraq -- as there has in the world --
that as
the pressure builds up in Iraq, the United States will move to abandon
the
war. Bush's re-election clearly indicates that the United States will
not be
abandoning the war. They are therefore recalculating their positions
in the
same way that the rest of the world is. Holding out against the Americans
and allowing their populations to aid the guerrillas made a great deal
of
sense if the United States was about to retreat from Iraq. It is quite
another matter if the United States is actually going to be increasing
pressure.
It is no accident that as Election Day approached, U.S. forces very
publicly
-- and very slowly -- massed around Al Fallujah. Al Fallujah was the
town in
which the United States signed its first accord with the guerrillas.
As the
election approached, the town went out of control. Now the election
is over,
the town is surrounded and Bush is president. It is a time for recalculation
in Al Fallujah as well, as there can be no doubt but that Bush is free
to
attack and might well do it.
Throughout the Sunni areas of Iraq -- as well as Shiite regions --
elders
are considering their positions, caught between the United States and
the
guerrillas, in light of the new permanence of the Americans. The United
States will be aggressive, but in an interesting way. It will be using
the
threat of American power as a lever to force the Sunni leadership into
reducing support for the guerrillas. Coupled with the carrot of enormous
bribes, the strategy could work. It might not eliminate the guerrilla
war,
but could reduce it to a nuisance level.
The basic reality thus creates the strategy. The re-election of Bush
creates
a new reality at all levels in the international system. His intransigence,
coupled with American power, forces players to think about whether they
can
hold their positions for at least four years, or whether they must adjust
their positions in some way. As the players -- from sheikhs to prime
ministers -- reconsider their positions, U.S. power increases, trying
to pry
them loose. It opens the possibility of negotiations and settlements
in
unexpected places.
It also opens the door to potential disaster. The danger is that Bush
will
simultaneously overestimate his power and feel unbearable pressure to
act
quickly. This has led some previous presidents into massive errors of
judgment. Put differently, the pressures and opportunities of the second
term caused them to execute policies that appeared to be solutions but
that
blew up in their faces. None of them knew they would blow up, but in
their
circumstances, no one was sufficiently cautious.
It is precisely Bush's lack of caution that now becomes his greatest
bargaining chip. But his greatest strength can also become his greatest
weakness. The struggle between these two poles will mark the first part
of
his presidency. We will find out whether the second part will be the
success
of this strategy or his downfall. The book on George W. Bush will now
be
written.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
