The Splintering of the Taliban: Washington's Deal with Pakistan

The United States has asked Pakistan to help Afghanistan's Karzai
administration reconcile with "good" Taliban. Washington and Kabul
understand the Taliban cannot be contained with military action alone, and
that any political approach will have to involve Pakistan, given the
latter's influence among ethnic Pashtuns and the militant Islamist movement.
This provides an opening for Islamabad to resurrect its influence over its
western neighbor.

The militant Islamist group Jaish al Muslimeen (Army of Muslims) -- an
offshoot of Afghanistan's jihadist Taliban movement led by former commander
Syed Akbar Agha -- claimed Oct. 29 it had abducted three foreign U.N.
workers who assisted in the recent presidential elections. The group
threatened to execute the workers if a rescue operation was launched.

This report comes two days after U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay
Khalilzad said in a speech at a university in Washington, D.C., the Bush
administration and Afghanistan want Pakistan to help the newly elected
government of President Hamid Karzai cultivate "good Taliban." Khalilzad
said many Taliban members are not guilty of crimes or militancy and could be
accommodated in the new Afghan government. This task, he said, requires
Islamabad's assistance.

Khalilzad's statements indicate that the Bush administration and the Karzai
regime have finally realized their efforts to co-opt moderates among the
Taliban in order to reduce militancy in the country will not bear fruit
without Pakistan's help.

The U.S./Afghan request for assistance provides Islamabad with the
opportunity to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan, but also provides
moderate Islamist forces on both sides of the old Durand line to enhance
themselves politically. Should the moderate Taliban group emerge as a result
of this, it will be the first moderate Islamist group among Afghani
Pashtuns.

There also is the danger that militant elements close to al Qaeda could take
advantage of this situation. Moreover, the non-Pashtun ethnic partners of
Karzai will view this as problematic -- to say the least.

Since the United States ousted the Taliban regime in 2001, Washington has
been trying to eliminate the Taliban militarily. When that did not work, the
Bush administration began trying to split the movement -- an effort to
defang it.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage reportedly met in Kandahar
with former Taliban Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmad Mutawakal, who then
reportedly was allowed to return home in exchange for a pledge to speak with
other moderate Taliban members about reconciling with U.S. forces in the
area. Mutawakal had surrendered shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime
in late 2001 and was released from detention in the fall of 2003. Mutawakal
also is believed to be have been a critic of the presence of al Qaeda in the
country while the militia ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001.

There since have been many contacts between Kabul and moderates among the
Taliban, including Mutawakal, who seems to have emerged as a leader of those
moderates willing to participate in the country's ongoing political process.

Karzai's brother-in-law Mohammed Ibrahim Spinzada -- also known as "Engineer
Ibrahim" in intelligence circles -- is handling the negotiations, given the
sensitive nature of the initiative.

According to a report in The Los Angeles Times, Karzai has quietly named his
brother-in-law as co-deputy intelligence chief. The president reportedly
also recently visited the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to speak
with Taliban prisoners and to help arrange the release of some of them, a
key condition set by the moderate Taliban faction before talks could take
place.

Other than Mutawakal, the leadership council of this moderate Taliban
splinter group includes a former senior adviser to Mullah Muhammad Omar,
Sayed Rahmatullah Hashemi, who conducted a public relations tour of the
United States in 2001 before the Sept. 11 attacks, and gave talks and media
interviews. It is likely Hashemi also was favored by the Bush
administration, given his prior links to Washington. Moreover, this faction
is based in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

Washington and Kabul now want Islamabad's help because of the deep
connections of the various Taliban groups to various Pakistani Islamist
groups and to the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence.

After Pakistan decided to withdraw its support for the Taliban -- and given
its lukewarm relations with the post-Taliban Karzai administration --
Islamabad had grown concerned about its waning influence in Kabul. This was
especially troublesome for the government of Pakistani President Gen. Pervez
Musharraf because as Islamabad-Kabul relations were declining, India enjoyed
increasingly good relations with many of the Northern Alliance elements in
the Afghan government.

As a result, Islamabad gladly will heed Khalilzad's call to exploit its
relations with the Taliban and the Pashtuns to help establish a Taliban
presence in the new government -- which will beef up support for the Karzai
government and allow Pakistan a medium of influence in Kabul. Such an
arrangement, however, will cause several problems.

First, this deal will take place through the offices of the Pakistani
moderate Islamist Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) alliance, which rules the
two provinces located on the Afghan-Pakistani border. This will allow the
MMA and the newly emerging moderate Taliban and other Pashtun Islamist
groups in Afghanistan to gain influence.

Second, al Qaeda and its allied militant Islamist groups could benefit from
a Taliban presence in Kabul. The extent to which jihadists can benefit from
this depends on how the Omar-led original Taliban faction reacts to the
creation of a formal moderate Taliban.

Third, Karzai's Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen and Kyrgyz allies in the
government will not like the return of the Taliban not only because of past
bitterness, but also because this beefs up the Pashtuns' position -- and
Karzai's as a result -- in the national government, especially in the lead
up to the parliamentary elections set for March 2005.

The emergence of both a militant and a moderate offshoot of the Taliban
movement proves the jihadist movement that once ruled more than 90 percent
of Afghanistan -- and hosted al Qaeda in its heyday -- has split.

Washington's and Kabul's need to co-opt a certain number of acceptable
Taliban rank and file in the administration of President-elect Hamid Karzai
will provide a means for Islamabad to regain its influence, which shrank
substantially after the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001. The law
of unintended consequences necessitates that both Pakistani and Afghani
moderate Islamist forces will benefit from a return of at least some of the
Taliban. If and when this happens, it will signal the birth of a moderate
Islamist political group among the Pashtuns. However, al Qaeda's past
connection to these nascent modernists also suggests that jihadists could
benefit from a Taliban entry into Kabul. It is much more likely ethnic
tensions will be fueled by this bid to get moderate Taliban involved in the
government.