Analysis
Since the outbreak of intense urban combat in Al Fallujah in April,
the U.S.
military has employed Kurdish forces -- Peshmerga -- to fight alongside
U.S.
soldiers. Sources within Iraq's tribal and political communities tell
Stratfor that this has been extended throughout Iraq to assist the United
States in quelling the violence. U.S. Command has never officially
acknowledged the presence of Peshmerga in its offensive operations,
but
sources within the U.S. military have intimated that the military maintains
close relationships with Kurdish militia groups.
The motivations behind using Kurdish forces are fairly obvious. There
is
virtually no reliable Arab Iraqi security force yet, and using Kurdish
forces frees the U.S. military from counterinsurgency operations, allowing
the military to focus on particularly troublesome areas. Despite those
relatively positive -- for the United States -- reasons for Kurdish
cooperation, the issue carries the potential to trigger a dangerous
trend in
Iraq in the long term.
In the short term, as far as the U.S. military is concerned, using
Kurdish
allies in suppressing the insurgency has few drawbacks -- with the possible
exception of intensified fighting in the cities where Kurds are deployed.
Peshmerga -- often under the guise of Iraqi national forces -- have
proven
to be reliable comrades in combat in Al Fallujah, An Najaf and Sadr
City
among other areas. Kurdish security forces have been deployed in areas
of
Northern Iraq, particularly in the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Baqubah
and Tal
Afar.
Additionally, Peshmerga are often used in lieu of Iraqi forces because
not
only have they proven far more reliable than the new Iraqi army --
exemplified by the Sept. 26 arrest of the man earmarked for leading
the
Iraqi national guard in Diyala province for his involvement in the
insurgency -- but also they are far better trained and more professional.
This stems in part from their history of operating as independent militia
for years and having combat experience battling Kurdish Islamist opponents
and elements of the old Iraqi army. The guerrillas also work in much
smaller
groups and are more committed to their ideals and the belief they are
"fighting the good fight."
Politically speaking, The United States can use an alliance with the
Kurds
to manipulate reluctant Iraqi sects to begin cooperating with the United
States and Interim Iraqi Government -- lest Kurdish security operations
continue.
The consequences of this alliance, however, go well beyond the immediate
tactical impact on the insurgency.
The use of Kurdish militia in lieu of U.S. or Arab-Iraqi military services
has engendered quite a bit of bad blood within the communities affected,
which include Arabs (Shia and Sunni) and ethnic Turkomen. This ill will
is
manifesting as a situation in which guerrilla operations are directed
against Kurdish security forces in areas where the Kurds are far from
dominant.
In areas like Baqubah and Mosul, where there is a mixture of Sunni
Arab,
Kurdish and Turkoman residents, there is a substantial Kurdish security
presence. There is ongoing urban guerrilla combat in the city of Tal
Afar
between the Kurdish militia and the city's Arab and Turkoman residents.
These are also the areas -- Nineveh, Diyala and Tamim -- where the Kurds
seek to establish political control.
The strongest evidence of the strife within these areas is the Sept.
14
slaying of 12 Kurdish militiamen in Baqubah. Kurdish sources have told
Stratfor that all the Kurds killed in Baqubah hailed from the town of
Khanaqin. In Khanaqin, Kurds widely believe that Sunni Arab guerrillas
were
behind the attack. In fact, tensions almost got out of control when
a
Kurdish mob in Khanaqin vowed to attack Sunni Arabs in Baqubah for revenge;
Kurdish tribal chiefs eventually defused the situation.
Baqubah is an interesting case because the mayor -- a Sunni Arab --
draws
much of his support from the region's Kurdish residents. The mayor is
stuck
between acquiescing to the demands of Sunni Arabs to remove Kurdish
influence on the city and alienating his Kurdish support base.
There have been no documented incidents of Arab Shiite insurgents carrying
out attacks against Kurdish security forces, although that could be
simply a
result of geography. That being said, Stratfor has learned from Turkoman
tribal sources that ethnic Turkomen in northern Iraq are beginning to
take
up arms against Kurdish security forces. This is a direct result of
the U.S.
military using Kurdish security forces in counter-insurgency operations
in
the Turkoman-dominated city of Tal Afar. Former Turkoman military officers
have begun coordinating attacks on Kurdish (and even U.S.) forces throughout
northern Iraq.
Disputes among Iraq's ethno-religious groups is nothing new; such
differences have been exploited by the United States (and before that,
by
Saddam Hussein; and before that, by the British Empire) to create a
situation favorable to its own interests. The use of Kurdish security
forces
is in line with that strategy, though it could have the opposite effect
in
the end. By polarizing Iraq into two camps -- essentially those who
cooperate with and/or support the United States and those who do not
-- the
U.S. military runs the risk of partially uniting different factions
against
a common enemy as the attitudes toward the United States on both sides
span
the spectrum of ethnic and religious differences.
The beginnings of this trend can be seen in Turkoman guerrilla operations
in
Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. Despite the ethnic and religious differences
--
Turkomen are usually Shiite, and many support Muqtada al-Sadr -- the
Turkomen and the Sunnis are working against a common enemy within the
same
cities and regions. In fact, Turkoman sources tell Stratfor that the
guerrilla units formed by Turkoman former Iraqi army officers included
a
number of Sunni Arab fighters as well.
For now, the only corroboration among the groups can be seen in their
mutual
disdain for those who cooperate with the United States. It may be too
early
to assess the likelihood of this leading to a new alliance, but it warrants
watching. If such an alliance arises, it could spell even more trouble
for
Kurdish, U.S. and Iraqi security forces that already have their hands
full
dealing with the insurgency.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
