Where is bin Laden? Al-Qaeda Media Activity on the 9/11 Anniversary
There was something of a minor surge in Al-Qaeda media traffic around
the
third anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. On
September 9 Al-Jazeera television received a video tape featuring al-Qaeda's
number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his first appearance in a year. Notable
too was the absence of bin Laden from the tape. Clearly timed to coincide
with the 9/11 anniversary, in what is taking on the appearance of a
tradition, Al-Zawahiri's address warned Americans that "defeat
in Iraq and
Afghanistan has become just a question of time, God willing", due
to their
being "caught between two fires: if they remain there they will
bleed to
death, and if they withdraw they will have lost everything." (Tape
released
to al-Jazeera, 9/9/2004)
The tape's recent production was supported by a reference to the recent
troubles in Darfur, and its authenticity was generally agreed upon by
intelligence analysts. All of which makes the non-appearance of bin
Laden
himself all the more intriguing, leading to speculation of his death,
or at
least of his reduced leadership role in Al-Qaeda's operations. Although
the
tone is triumphalist, and intended to demonstrate 'business as usual',
the
most interesting feature of the address was that it contained clear
undertones of a pep talk aimed at boosting morale. Al-Zawahiri's claims
to
Taliban control of 'the entire east and south of Afghanistan' are certainly
disputed by the U.S. military and also by President Hamid Karzai, who
considers disarray among the participating regional warlords a greater
threat to Afghanistan than remnants of the Taliban.
Morale boosting was certainly the governing tone of the latest issue,
no.
24, of the al-Qaeda online magazine Sawt al-Jihad, which appeared on
Islamist websites in time for the 9/11 anniversary. Here, in amongst
the
theological justifications for jihad in the holy month of Rajab,
considerable space has been given over to exhortations to continue the
fight, despite all the reverses. In an opening address entitled: Yes,
Bush,
you cannot defeat terrorism! (Sawt al-Jihad, p.3), and liberally sprinkled
with Qur'anic quotations, Sheikh Hamud al-'Utaybi acknowledges the major
reverses, such as the fall of the Islamic state in Afghanistan, but
paints
them as 'temporary victories, . for you cannot conquer the Believers,
since
the present struggle is simply a continuation of the Ayyam, [the days
of
early Muslim struggles against the infidel]'. He then goes on to point
to
the subsequent American reverses in Iraq and Afghanistan 'the graveyard
of
U.S. soldiers', and equates the Russians with the same fate, listing
the
Ingush and Chechen attacks, and the latest series of suicide bombings
including the Beslan school operation, 'a victory like that of the theatre
operation in Moscow, Praise God'.
The theme is continued with Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid's essay: 'Stand
fast, O
People of Islam, for Victory is Nigh!' (Sawt, p.16). Again the text
is rich
in doctrinal quotations and thin on hard facts to back this victory
up, and
soon dissolves into exhortations to greater piety and observance of
the
obligations of the faith, or study of their ancient mujahideen forbears
as
the surest road to conquest. The defensive tone continues when the subject
of Saudi successes against the al-Qaeda leadership is broached: 'When
one
leader dies, there arises another.If Abu Hajar [al-Muqrin] or others
are
killed, God Almighty brings forth sincere men who will dismay you' (Sawt,
p.28). 'There is no conquest without martyrdom', the argument continues,
now
fleshed out by extracting texts from the 8th century Islamic legal authority
Imam al-Shafi'i, demonstrating how defeat is merely a precursor to victory
(Sawt, p.30). Finally, Al-Ayyiri's essay: Jihad is not Dependent upon
a
Single Battle (Sawt, p.31) recalls nothing if not the tone of the 1914
poster countering the demoralization of the French: 'Citizens, we have
lost
a battle, but we have not lost the war.'
A similar conclusion can be drawn from a second 9/11 anniversary tape,
this
time published by al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,
which
appeared on Islamist websites on September 11. Less verifiable for the
date
of its production, although authenticity seems established, Al-Zarqawi's
address follows the same pattern of bluster followed by undertones of
anxiety. 'The holy warriors' he states triumphantly, 'made the international
coalition taste humiliation ... lessons from which they are still burning'.
The battle with the Shi'ite militia of Muqtada al-Sadr he dismisses
as a
sideshow designed to scare the true opposition in 'the courageous and
steadfast Sunni Triangle', but the tone of bravado soon gives way to
frustration. Al-Zarqawi appeals to the mujahideen who have come from
abroad
to 'keep your hands on the trigger', remain alert, and remember that
'missions [to propagate the faith] have never been a road lined with
roses
and sweet basil; the price is heavy. a plethora of torn limbs and blood.'
He
continues, 'Far be it from God to leave you to perish.. You will subdue
America. By God you will subdue America, though it may take a while
longer'.
Although the appearance of the taped address was soon accompanied by
the
latest crescendo of attacks undertaken by his Tawhid and Jihad group,
and
which caused 150 fatalities over a period of three days, as if to emphasize
its continuing capacities, numbers may mislead. There is reason to give
considered weight to the tone of Al-Zarqawi's address, over against
the
bombing statistics alone. Supposing the tape to be of recent production,
at
a time when U.S. air strikes are targeting insurgent groups, there may
be
reasons for his advice not to fear enemy airplanes since 'God is above
[their] airplanes and is of yet greater might.' In a final plea which
may
refer to the recent deals made by U.S. negotiators with local leaders
in
towns of the Sunni triangle, Al-Zarqawi makes 'a call for help from
the deep
to the lions in Baghdad and Al-Anbar, and to the heroes in Diyala and
Samarra, and to the tigers in Mosul and the north'.
It may be that despite the popular use of the title of 'al-Qaeda's
leader in
Iraq', Al-Zarqawi is actually feeling himself isolated even within the
broader movement. A tantalizing glimpse of possible friction at the
top was
provided by the Arabic newspaper Al-Zaman (issue 8-9 September). On
its
front page the Iraqi daily quoted Moroccan intelligence sources that
revealed 'the existence of differences between Ayman al-Zawahiri, the
right
hand man to the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi'.
The Moroccan sources maintained they had information that 'there is
a
current in al-Qaeda which is changing over to Al-Zarqawi and which is
prepared to offer him allegiance instead'. The differences, the sources
maintained, 'centre on the post of second man in al-Qaeda, a position
which
Al-Zawahiri occupies as his successor to bin Ladin in the case of the
latter's death or imprisonment.'
Is there an indication here that bin Laden is still alive, but ailing
fast?
If so, it would provide an explanation for his mysterious non-appearance
in
Al-Zawahiri's 'anniversary' video. We may therefore expect a further,
more
important announcement from Al-Zawahiri.
Australian Terrorism Fears Materialize
The prediction concerning the potential targeting of Australia, made
in the
last edition of Terrorism Focus, duly came to pass. It came in the form
of
two incidents within a few days of each other, one an attack on the
Australian embassy in Jakarta, the other in the reputed abduction of
Australian nationals working in Iraq.
On September 9 a car bomb exploded outside the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta, resulting in the death of at least 9 Indonesians and the wounding
of hundreds more. No Australians were killed in the attack. The bombing
was
claimed by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian terror network
linked
to al-Qaeda. The bombings could conceivably have been timed to coincide
with
the September 20 Indonesian presidential elections or the impending
prosecution of jailed cleric Abu Bakar Basyir, accused of heading the
JI.
However a statement posted on an Islamist site by the JI outlined its
purpose, as it warned all Australians to leave Indonesia "or else,
God
willing, we will make it a graveyard for them" and demanded that
the
Australian government withdraw its troops from Iraq.
The statement by the Jemaah Islamiyah , issued a month before the Australian
presidential elections of October 9, has a particular resonance for
Australia since it is the same organization that carried out the October
2002 Bali bombings in which 88 Australians were among the 200 killed.
Investigations are at present focusing on establishing the link between
two
major suspects to the destroyed car via its chassis number, a technique
that
led to successful prosecutions following the Bali bombing. The chief
suspects are Azahari bin Husin, a British-trained engineer who taught
bomb-making classes in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and Noordin
Mohammed
Top, an explosives expert. Both are Malaysians who, authorities say,
are key
members of JI. They are both still at large and Australians now fear
an
attack from a second active JI cell in the country.
Further pressure on the Australian elections was applied a few days
later on
September 13, with the announcement that two Australians had been taken
hostage in Iraq by a group calling itself the Islamic Secret Army's
'Horror
Brigades'. This name cropped up earlier in the month on notices plastered
on
walls in Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, which announced the killing of
'three
Mossad agents' and the abduction of a Turkish driver. According to a
report
by the AFP News agency, in statements circulated in the city of Samarra,
the
kidnappers have threatened to kill the hostages 'without a second chance'
if
Australian Prime Minister John Howard in person does not announce the
withdrawal of the over 800 Australian troops remaining in Iraq. However,
at
the time of publication the Australian defense minister Robert Hill
said
that the government had accounted for all Australian citizens in the
country. In addition, the fact that the kidnapped Australians were never
named - the abductors merely referring to them as 'security contractors'
-
along with the passing of the 24-hour deadline in mid-week, means that
strong doubts are cast on the Islamic Secret Army's claims.
If Australians have indeed been taken hostage, the situation will have
been
complicated for them by Howard's outspoken criticisms of Spain and the
Philippines for having given in to terrorists' demands, and by opposition
leader Mark Latham's closing of ranks with the Prime Minister in rejecting
negotiations.
The Madrid bombings last March were seen by jihadists as a success,
due to
the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. If a tie-in with
an
electoral process promises the potential of more direct, domestic political
leverage, the next obvious candidate for the tactic might appear to
be the
U.S. presidential elections in November. As to whether this is attempted
will depend on whether the kidnappers are more Iraqi 'nationalist' in
orientation than 'global Jihadist'. If the former, the lack of an opposition
party's explicit call for troop withdrawal removes much of the attraction.
If the latter, a group that sees in President Bush an important focus
for
popular antagonism, a dramatic terror attack will serve their purpose
well.
Yemeni Rebel Leader Al-Houthi Slain
Yemeni government sources formally announced on September 10 the end
of the
rebellion under Zaidi Shi'ite tribal chief Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
This follows the killing of al-Houthi and his brother as the result
of an
attack on their hideout in the region of Sha'ab Salman in Sa'ada province
near the Saudi border, 150 miles north of the capital Sana'a. Their
deaths
mark the termination of a three-month punitive campaign, which has killed
up
to 600 civilians, rebels and troops.
Since the outbreak of the rebellion on June 18, al-Houthi had directed
his
followers, the Shabab al-Mu'minoon ('Believing Youth'), in a vigorous
guerrilla campaign characterized above all by its anti-US sloganeering,
and
rejection of Washington's policies in Iraq and the wider region. As
a Yemeni
local issue and - due to doctrinal antagonism - unconnected with al-Qaeda
inspired groups in the country, the rebellion looked to the Lebanese
Shi'ite
Hizbullah for an operational model, and has been suspected of Iranian
support. Its military muscle was trained and indoctrinated in unauthorized
religious schools where, according to Sana'a, a policy was taught of
armed
resistance to central authority and a program for the restoration of
the
long-abolished monarchy.
While the government of Ali Abdullah Salih is counting on exploiting
a
significant boost to prestige, which may enable it to promote further
the
disarmament program in a country where weapons outnumber population
three to
one, the potential for further conflict remains. Al-Houthi's scattered
supporters vow to fight on. "The issue will not be ended by the
death of
Sheikh Al-Houthi" a source close to al-Houthi said, "Many
will adopt the
cause for the sake of which Al-Houthi was martyred... War will continue
endlessly, and the authority will not find rest unless it answers their
crucial and lawful demands" (Yemen Times, 13-15th September). Despite
such
comments, the likelihood of a reprise of the fighting soon on this scale
is
small. However, a three-month armed rebellion of up to 3,000 insurgents
building its momentum on little more than vaguely defined antagonism
to the
U.S. (which is not an occupier of the country) should give some pause
for
thought.
MILF Warn against JI Infiltration in the Philippines
The largest Islamist insurgency group in the Philippines, the Moro
Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), has issued strict instructions to its members
not
to link up with any members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who may be
entering
the southern island of Mindanao in order to lie low following their
bombing
of the Australian embassy in Jakarta. According to a September 13 report
in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, MILF chairman, Murad Ibrahim, issued
the call
out of fears that ongoing peace talks with Manila to end a 30-year conflict
that has killed 120,000 people might be compromised.
Manila has previously accused the MILF of offering its bases to the
JI for
training the Indonesian militants, and launched punitive strikes against
the
southern secessionists, despite previous cease-fire agreements. In the
recent period the MILF has successfully negotiated for the withdrawal
of
Filipino troops, the dropping of criminal charges against over 100 rebels,
and the presence of international ceasefire monitors in Mindanao. Now
it
feels its gains are under threat.
Hence the strenuous attempts to demonstrate its bona fides by agreeing
to
begin talks on October 10 on practical measures to help the military
track
and arrest JI militants and kidnap gangs operating in its territory.
The
talks are to firm up 'guidelines' for joint action, which will enable
MILF
policing actions of this kind to have proper legal underpinning (Reuters,
September 16).
The action is timely, since they come at a time when Police intelligence
reports in Mindanao have been highlighting movements of JI members over
the
last two months, including at least 30 at a training camp in Mt. Cararao
in
Lanao del Sur, a known MILF base. Unverified reports claim sightings
of
suspected Indonesian and Afghan bomb trainers and manufacturers in
Maguindanao, which have lead to fears of JI car bomb attacks in Davao
City
or General Santos City. The MILF have made strenuous attempts to counter
the
reports, calling for an open investigation by the Coordinating Committee
on
the Cessation of Hostilities. But it acknowledges that its warning to
avoid
contact with JI members may be dismissed by 'lost commands' in the movement,
who remain sympathetic to JI's aims.
Qaeda Suspect in Court: "New Osamas will Arise"
Confirmation of al-Qaeda's role in last November's suicide truck bombings
in
Istanbul came on September 13 at the trial of the 69 Turkish suspects,
deferred since last May pending judicial reorganization. Of those charged
with complicity in the bombing against two synagogues, a London-based
bank
and the British Consulate in Istanbul, which killed a total of 61 people.
The most important figure was Harun Ilhan. Admitting that he and two
other
suspected ringleaders - Habib Akdas and Gurcan Bac - were responsible,
Ilhan
openly referred to himself as 'an al-Qaeda warrior'. He remained truculent
throughout his court appearance, refusing to acknowledge the court's
jurisdiction and demanding that he be given prisoner-of-war status.
Ilhan
also warned that if Turkey continued to support the USA, "we will
never
leave the Republic of Turkey, the price will be paid." He also
underlined
how al-Qaeda is now independent of bin Laden's fate, and that if he
dies
'yeni Usame'ler çýkaracaktýr', "new Osamas
will arise" (maksimum.com,
September 13).
Details emerging from the trial underline the role played by al-Qaeda
in
developing the terror network. Although from Ilhan's evidence al-Qaeda
did
not appear to have a structure in Turkey, the November attacks being
carried
out by 'an operations group', a second suspect, Adnan Ersoz, detailed
how he
had been trained to use light weapons during a trip to Afghanistan,
and how
Abu Hafs al-Masri, bin Laden's one time lieutenant, had given him U.S.
$8,900 to bring Turks to Afghanistan to wage jihad (Turkish Daily News,
September 14). Ersoz confirmed that al-Qaeda had originally mulled an
attack
on an Israeli ship making a call in Turkey, or on the southern Turkish
Incirlik air base used by U.S. aircraft in the campaign against Iraq.
Habib
Akdas, now believed to have been killed during a recent U.S. bombing
in
Iraq, was tasked with researching the target, and appears to have received
US $150,000 from al-Qaeda supporters in Syria and Iran. Turkey has recently
abolished the death penalty, so prosecutors are demanding life sentences
for
five suspects with direct roles in the bombings.
Muslim Clerics under Fire
The after-effects of the Beslan school massacre are making themselves
felt
in some serious introspection among Arab commentators. One of the most
graphic reactions was that made by Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid, manager
of the
satellite television station Al Arabiya, in a comment that achieved
some
celebrity: "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists,
but it
is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists
are Muslims" (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 8). This was the prelude
to a
severe criticism of the role of hard-line clerics in fostering a culture
of
religiously-sanctioned violence. Other commentators developed the same
theme. In Kuwait, the columnist Abdullah al-Jasami deplored religious
pronouncements which "reflect the mentality of violence, extremism,
and the
absence of debate from the discourse of many clerics", arguing
that they
"play a complementary role to the violence and terrorism that is
being
perpetrated on the ground by providing such acts with religious Shari'a
cover." (Al-Ra'i al-'Am, 8 September).
A particular subject for attack was the conservative Egyptian cleric,
Sheikh
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has a high media presence in the Middle East
through
his appearances on television. He is famous for having issued a fatwa
licensing the targeting of U.S. civilians in Iraq, justifying this on
the
grounds that they form part of the 'invading force'. In May this year
his
sermon called for divine intervention against "the oppressive tyrants,
including Zionists and Americans and their supporters. Take them, O
God, and
their supporters with Your might" (Doha TV, translated by FBIS,
May 14).
Under the furor, Al-Qaradawi has since attempted to distance himself
from
his earlier pronouncements, but the doctrinal vagueness remains. On
September 9 clerics at the influential Egyptian Al-Azhar University
declared
their support for the killing of American civilians in Iraq, stating
that if
these civilians are engaged in supplying the military in any way Islam
permits their killing. (Al-Bassa'ir, Baghdad, quoted by MEMRI).
_____
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Terrorism Focus is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. It is
researched and edited by Stephen Ulph, a specialist in economic and
political developments of the Middle East and North Africa. He is the
founder and editor of the Terrorism Security Monitor and editor and
analyst
of Islamic Affairs for Jane's Information Group.
The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual authors and
do not
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