The war was begun by al Qaeda, and therefore its state must be viewed
through al Qaeda's eyes. From that standpoint, the war is not going
well at
all. Al Qaeda did not attack the United States on Sept. 11 simply to
kill
Americans. Al Qaeda wanted to kill Americans in order to achieve a political
goal: the recreation of at least part of the caliphate, an empire ruled
by
Islamic law and feared and respected by the rest of the world.
Al Qaeda's view was that the real obstacles to such a caliphate were
the
governments of Muslim countries. These governments either were apostates,
were corrupt or were so complicit with Christian, Jewish or Hindu regimes
that not only did they not represent Islamic interests, but they had
sold
out the immediate interests of their own people.
From al Qaeda's point of view, the power of these regimes resided in
their
relationship with foreign powers. Moreover, the perception of these
foreign
powers -- particularly the United States, which had become the latest
edition of Christianity's leading foreign power -- was that they were
irresistible. Muslim countries had not defeated a Christian power in
war for
centuries. Hatred ran deep, but so did impotence. Al Qaeda was far less
interested in increasing hatred of the United States than in showing
that
the United States was vulnerable -- that it could be defeated. Al Qaeda
argued that the mujahideen had demonstrated this in Afghanistan against
the
Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union collapsed as a result. If al Qaeda
could
demonstrate America's vulnerability, a sense of confidence would infuse
the
Islamic world and regimes would fall or change their policies.
The Sept. 11 attacks were designed to demonstrate the vulnerability
of the
United States. They also were designed to entice the United States to
wage
multiple wars in the Islamic world while pursuing al Qaeda directly
and
indirectly, further opening the United States up to attack and attrition.
Al
Qaeda did demonstrate American vulnerability, and the United States
did
surge into the Muslim world. It did encounter resistance and took
casualties.
But al Qaeda completely failed to achieve its strategic goals.
There was no rising in the Islamic street. Not a single Muslim regime
fell.
Not a single regime moved closer to al Qaeda's position. Almost all
Muslim
regimes moved to closer cooperation with the United States. Viewed through
the lens of al Qaeda's hopes and goals, therefore, the war so far has
been a
tremendous failure. In various tapes and releases, al Qaeda officials
--
including Osama bin Laden -- have expressed their frustration and their
commitment to continue the struggle. However, it is essential to realize
that from al Qaeda's strategic point of view, the last three years have
been
a series of failures and disappointments.
This is the objective reality. It is not the American perception.
The first reason for this perception gap is the definition the
administration has given the war: It is a war on terrorism. If the goal
of
the war has been to deny al Qaeda strategic victory, then the United
States
is winning the war. If, on the other hand, the goal of the war is to
protect
the homeland against any further attacks by al Qaeda or other groups,
then
that goal has not been achieved.
Al Qaeda's primary operational capability is its ability to evade U.S.
intelligence capabilities. This is not a trivial capability.
Three years into the war, the precise shape and distribution of al
Qaeda and
related organizations are still not transparent to U.S. intelligence.
However much more the United States knows about al Qaeda, it does not
appear
that its abilities are sufficient to guarantee the security of the United
States or allied countries against enemy attacks. There are too many
potential targets, and al Qaeda remains too invisible to guarantee that.
Therefore, on a purely operational level, the United States does not
see
itself as winning the war. During World War II, for example -- by 1943
or
even earlier -- the United States was secure from German or Japanese
attacks
against the homeland. That is not the case in this war. Therefore, there
is
an interesting paradox built in. On the strategic side, al Qaeda is
losing
-- and thus the United States is winning -- the strategic war, and this,
of
course, is the decisive sphere. On the operational side, even though
there
has thus far been no repeat of the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States,
the war is at a stalemate. Public perception is more sensitive to the
operational stalemate than to the strategic success.
This has led to a crisis of confidence about the war that has been
compounded by a single campaign -- Iraq -- which has dwarfed the general
war
in apparent importance. As readers of Stratfor know, our view of the
Iraq
campaign has been that it was the logical next step in the general war
and
that the Bush administration knew that by February 2002, when it became
apparent that U.S. intelligence could not strike globally to destroy
al
Qaeda. It has also been our view that the Iraq campaign was marred by
extremely poor intelligence and planning.
We have also argued that such failures are not only common in war but
inevitable, and that these failures, however egregious, were to be expected.
We have also argued, and continue to be amazed, that the single greatest
failure of the Bush administration in this war has been its inability
to
give a coherent explanation of why it invaded Iraq. The public justification
-- that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction -- was patently absurd
on its
face. You do not invade a country with a year's warning if you are really
afraid of WMD.
The incoherence of the justification was self-evident prior to the
war, and
the failure to find WMD was merely icing on the cake. The consequence
was a
crisis of confidence that was a very unlikely outcome after Sept. 11
and
which the administration built for itself. In other words, the decision
to
invade Iraq was, from our point of view, inevitable following the failure
of
the covert war. What was not inevitable was the catastrophic failure
to
explain the invasion and the resulting crisis of confidence.
The clearest explanation for this failure has to do with Saudi Arabia
and
the U.S. relation to the kingdom -- a relationship that goes far beyond
the
Bush family or either political party.
Saudi Arabia was one of the reasons for the invasion. The U.S.
intent was to frighten the Saudis into policy change, demonstrating
(a) that
the Saudis were now surrounded by U.S.
troops and (b) that the United States was no longer influenced by the
Saudis. The goal was to force the Saudis to change their behavior toward
financing al Qaeda. Stating this goal publicly would have destabilized
the
Saudi regime, however, and the United States wanted policy change, not
regime change. Therefore, Washington preferred to appear the fool rather
than destabilize Saudi Arabia.
If this is the explanation -- and we emphatically do believe, from
all
analysis and sources, that the administration did have a much more
sophisticated strategy in place on Iraq than it has ever been able to
enunciate -- then it was one with severe costs.
Apart from the specific failures in the war, the generation of a massive
crisis of confidence in the United States over the Iraq campaign has
become
a strategic reality of the wider war. To the extent that this is a war
of
perception -- and on some level, all wars are -- the perception that
the
United States is deeply divided is damaging. The actual debate is over
the
Iraq campaign and not the war as a whole, but this has increasingly
been
lost in the clamor. There is much more consensus on the war as a whole
than
might appear.
Therefore, we can say that al Qaeda has failed to achieve its strategic
goals. At the same time, the United States is facing its own strategic
crisis. Since Vietnam, the fundamental question has been whether the
United
States has sufficient will and national unity to execute a long-term
war.
One of the purposes of the Iraq invasion was to demonstrate American
will.
The errors in what we might call information warfare -- or propaganda
-- by
the Bush administration have generated severe doubts. The administration's
management of the situation has turned into a strategic defeat -- although
not a decisive one as yet.
Massive dissent about wars has been the norm in American history.
We tend to think of World War II as the norm, but, quite the contrary,
it
was the exception. The Revolutionary War, Mexican War, Civil War, Vietnam
War and others all contained amazing levels of rancor among the American
public. The vilification among the citizenry of Washington's generalship
or
Lincoln's presidency during the action was quite amazing. Thus, it is
not
the dissent that is startling, but the perception of U.S.
weakness that it generates in the Islamic world. And the responsibility
does
not rest with the dissidents, but with the president's failure to understand
the strategic consequences of public incoherence on policy issues. Keeping
it simple works only when the simple explanation is not too difficult
to
understand.
Let us therefore consider the salient points:
Al Qaeda has failed to reach its strategic goals.
The United States has not secured the homeland against attack.
There has been a major realignment in the Muslim world's governments,
due to
U.S. politico-military operations that have favored the United States.
There has been no mass uprising in the Islamic world as a result of
the
Sept. 11 attacks.
The Iraq campaign has involved massive failures, but the casualty rate
remains less than 2 percent of the total killed in Vietnam.
That places the problem in perspective. In addition, the political
situation
is increasingly manageable in Iraq.
The strategic management of information operations has been the major
U.S.
failure. It is serious enough to threaten the strategic thrust of the
war
against al Qaeda. The inability to provide a coherent explanation for
Iraq
has substantially harmed the war effort.
At the same time, this should not be overestimated. It is interesting
to
note the problem that John Kerry is having in articulating his own challenge
to the president over Iraq and the war in general. He has three potential
strategies:
Reject the war in general
Reject the Iraq campaign but embrace the rest of the war
Accept Iraq and the war and argue that he would be more competent in
executing both
Kerry vacillates between the last two positions for a reason. If he
takes
the first position, he risks alienating the center, where voters are
uncomfortable with any anti-war position but want superior leadership
and
execution. If he accepts the third position, he can take the center
but
risks the possibility that hard-core anti-war leftists will stay home
on
Election Day.
Therefore, he is avoiding a strategic decision between the last two
positions -- shifting tactically between the two, hoping to bridge the
gap.
This is a difficult plan, but it seems the only one open to him. It
is also
the factor that will limit the extent of strategic damage stemming from
Bush's presentation of the Iraq campaign. Kerry won't be able to effectively
exploit that damage because of his own political problems.
Therefore, at this moment, we would argue that the war, on the whole,
is
being won by the United States or, more precisely, is being lost by
al
Qaeda. The purely military aspects of the war are going better for the
United States than is the politico- military effort, primarily due to
the
complexity of coercing allies without causing them public humiliation.
But
that is also the weak point of the U.S. campaign and the point at which
al
Qaeda will try to counterattack. That covert coercion could, al Qaeda
hopes,
energize a political movement it is trying to create.
The war is far from over. The snapshot of the moment does not tell
us what
either side may do in the future. The United States clearly intends
to move
into Pakistan to find bin Laden's command center. Al Qaeda clearly intends
to destabilize Saudi Arabia and any other target of opportunity that
might
open up -- Pakistan or Egypt. And in the end, as in all wars, there
will be
a negotiation. It is impossible to really envision what that negotiation
would look like or who the parties would actually be, but -- returning
to
the point that this war, like all others, will end -- complete victory
by
either side is the least likely scenario.
Whatever the outcome, this much must be understood. On Nov. 8, the
United
States will have a president who will never again stand for re-election.
He
may have the office for four more years or for only two more months.
In
either case, we can expect that an attempt at decisive action will occur.
Win or lose, Bush will be looking for his place in history. A Bush acting
without political constraints will be the wild card in the next phase
of the
war.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
http://www.stratfor.com <http://www.stratfor.com/>
