Analysis
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a group that is part of al Qaeda's global
jihadist network, issued a statement warning European nations that they
had
two weeks to pull their troops out of Iraq, before the 90-day truce
offered
April 15 by Osama bin Laden expires, the newspapers Asharq al-Awsat
and
al-Hayat reported July 2.
The jihadist network knows European countries will not comply with
its
demand, and from a tactical point of view, the continued presence of
European troops in Iraq has no bearing on al Qaeda -- which has no presence
in Iraq.
Instead, al Qaeda is using the issue of Iraq (like that of the Palestinian
territories, where it also has no presence) to further its strategic
objective of snatching the role of the vanguard of the Islamic world
from
established Muslim states. But al Qaeda's threats are not idle. The
confidence and persistence with which al Qaeda has been going after
Europe
are predicated on having assets in place to strike when needed -- to
keep
its actions in line with its rhetoric.
After the March 11 train attacks in Madrid, which killed more than
200
people and wounded at least 1,500 others, bin Laden issued a taped message
announcing a three-month cessation of all al Qaeda activity in Europe.
He
explained this as a grace period allowing European states with forces
in
Iraq the chance to withdraw them.
Al Qaeda seems to think that since the U.S.-led coalition transferred
power
to the Interim Iraqi Government on June 28, it will be easier to get
European states -- many with a significant part of their population
opposed
to the decision to send troops to Iraq -- to effect a pullout.
But a withdrawal does nothing for al Qaeda. The jihadist fighters in
Iraq
are under the leadership of an independent jihadist militant, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, who has been unsuccessfully trying to get al Qaeda involved
in
the country and has appealed for bin Laden's help. It appears that al
Qaeda
is concentrating on gaining political stature in the Muslim world.
Al Qaeda is more interested in affecting domestic politics in Western
states
with a calculated and precision strike somewhere in Europe, where evidence
shows that it has the capability to launch an attack when it sees fit.
Such
an event would bolster al Qaeda's standing among Muslims, who perceive
their
governments as being impotent against foreign intrusions.
It is increasingly apparent that al Qaeda has been able to delegate
operational activities to autonomous groups -- in places like Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Far East -- within its ideological,
organizational and tactical orbit. There also are independent groups
like
al-Zarqawi's Monotheism and Jihad, which are inspired by al Qaeda, but
wage
jihadist campaigns against Muslim regimes and foreign forces in their
own
sphere of operations. This mix allows al Qaeda to focus on enhancing
itself
as a political entity taking care of the affairs of the Muslim ummah
(nation).
Just how successful al Qaeda will be in this attempt to gain a broader
political reception among Muslims will depend on the evolving Muslim
perception of U.S. policies in their part of the world.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
