Analysis
A Pakistani man arrested in May in the small Texas town of Tyler has
been
accused of plotting to carry out terrorist attacks on the West Coast.
FBI
agents arrested Osama Haroon Satti after he bought a handgun and silencer
from an undercover agent and asked where he would be able to acquire
more.
Satti allegedly has been linked to a group of men who were arrested
in
Virginia on suspicion of involvement with terrorist organizations.
There is little in Satti's background to mark him as an aspiring Islamist
militant: He first entered the United States on a student visa in 1990,
and
worked in the computer industry before returning to Pakistan 11 years
later.
He holds an MBA from the Rochester Institute of Technology.
Satti -- like many other foreign workers in the United States -- has
been
caught up in the nation's counterterrorism dragnet, as federal officials
seek out members of dormant sleeper cells. If the allegations against
Satti
and others are true, authorities could be rooting out militants from
some
seemingly unlikely places.
Higher Education
Two characteristics that appear repeatedly in the backgrounds of suspected
militants arrested by U.S. authorities are high levels of education
and an
interest in technology. Though millions of foreign workers with similar
backgrounds -- and absolutely no connections to terrorism -- have entered
the country for years, it is noteworthy that militant organizations
easily
could infiltrate by exploiting the visa process.
In fact, at least two of the Sept. 11 hijackers -- Mohammed Atta and
Marwan
al-Shehhi, who entered the country on tourist visas -- were approved
for M-1
student visas shortly before carrying out their attacks. Approval forms
from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service arrived at the al Qaeda members'
Florida flight training school exactly six months after Atta and al-Shehhi
died at the helms of the planes that plowed into the World Trade Center
towers.
Consider also the following cases:
* Maher "Mike" Mofeid Hawas: A naturalized U.S. citizen who
worked as a lead
engineer for Intel Corp. He was arrested in August 2003 after traveling
to
China and allegedly attempting to enter Afghanistan to fight with the
Taliban. Hawas pleaded guilty in August 2003 to aiding terrorist
organizations and was sentenced to seven years in prison.
* Mohammed Atique: A Pakistani native who arrived in the United States
in
1996 to study electrical engineering. Atique worked for a number of
wireless
communication companies before his arrest May 8, 2003. He is among the
group
of 11 men who have been dubbed the "Virginia Jihad," accused
of colluding
with militant organization Lashkar e Taiba (LeT). Atique was sentenced
in
December 2003 to more than 10 years in prison.
* Khwaja Hassan: Another member of the "Virginia Jihad."
Hassan is a
naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan who holds a master's degree in
business technology. He was arrested while working as a teacher in Saudi
Arabia and extradited to the United States in July 2003 on suspicion
of
involvement with LeT. A federal court sentenced Hassan to more than
11 years
in prison in November 2003.
These are only a few examples of men who have been accused of belonging
to
militant sleeper cells within the United States. Though the actual proof
in
many cases is open to question, the security threat posed by sleeper
cells
is not.
The case of the Virginia Jihad -- nine of whose 11 members ultimately
were
convicted -- is of interest, in part because it involves an eclectic
assortment of suspects that includes native U.S. citizens, a Korean
immigrant and a former U.S. Marine. These backgrounds, along with high
education and stable employment histories, obviously would help sleeper
cell
members to blend into the populace while planning any attacks -- unlike
those who are involved with document falsification or other crimes that
can
draw the attention of investigators. Sleeper cells might not be an exclusive
club for foreign-born jihadists: Testimony during the trials of the
Virginia
Jihad suspects showed this group was not planted in the United States
for
militant purposes, but rather that its members were ideologically
sympathetic to Islamist movements and were recruited into the LeT cause
after living in the United States for years.
Given the level of sophistication that was evident in the Sept. 11
attacks
-- and that likely is required to carry out further strikes within the
United States -- it is logical to conclude that the leaders and members
of
militant sleeper cells are required to have a higher level of education
than
are the jihadist foot soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq or the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also is conceivable that they maintain
stable, legal employment with American companies.
Additionally, it is worth noting that, in light of the current focus
on
counterterrorism, sleeper cells and locally grown Islamist movements
likely
are operating with minimal guidance from al Qaeda, and are planning
or
carrying out operations on their own. This makes it all the more difficult
to identify and disrupt the cells.
Focus on Background Checks
The May 1 attacks in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, prompted many Western corporations
to re-evaluate their own employees and security procedures. It is possible
for dormant militants to remain in place for years before showing any
signs
of posing a threat: Some of the attackers in Yanbu were longtime employees
of the targeted company, ABB Lummus -- they possessed access badges
and
enjoyed the confidence of their colleagues. Such a scenario is equally
plausible within the United States, which places heightened emphasis
on
solid corporate security measures.
For privately held companies, conducting a thorough background check
on
workers can be extremely difficult. The required infrastructure in countries
such as Pakistan and India, which contribute large numbers of workers
to the
United States, is practically non-existent -- heightening the potential
for
militants to exploit the L-1 visa process, which allows U.S.-based companies
to import foreign workers with little diplomatic oversight.
Moreover, U.S. corporations do not have access to government-run
counterterrorism databases -- making it difficult to know if an employee
has
been identified by federal officials as having links to militant groups.
Stratfor previously said Yanbu-style attacks -- or small-scale assaults
involving well-trained, knowledgeable operatives -- would become more
likely.
Such attacks depend on militants having intimate knowledge of their
target
and the trust of coworkers and employers.
Though it is impossible to measure the number of people involved with
sleeper cells in the United States or to give a definitive description
of
their backgrounds, a few facts are worth noting:
* Because of a dearth of American workers with qualifications in math,
science and engineering, large numbers of foreign workers have entered
the
United States to pursue careers in those fields -- frequently on student,
or
F-1/M-1, visas.
* The high tech industry, which draws on workers with math, science
and
engineering degrees, offers an economic and social status that law enforcers
tend to view as incompatible with public threats.
* The number of visas awarded to foreign workers was reduced following
the
Sept. 11 attacks, after investigations showed that some of the hijackers
entered the country legally with F-1/M-1 status. However, since the
sleeper
cell cycle is measured in years, it is entirely possible that militants
who
entered the country some time ago with student visas would only now
be
entering into an active attack phase.
* Members of any new sleeper cells seeking to enter the United States
likely
would seek other forms of cover -- whether legal or illegal. The lack
of a
broad base of support for Islamist causes within the United States --
unlike
in Europe, where there are large sympathetic populations with pre-existing
communication channels and "safe houses" -- makes it less
likely that cells
would exist entirely of illegal immigrants and unemployed militants.
Source: Stratfor
