Analysis
Stratfor accurately predicted in October 2002 that a war in Saudi Arabia
would erupt between al Qaeda and the ruling House of Saud. That war
is under
way. Al Qaeda's tactics have become all too clear, with killings and
kidnappings of Westerners having become a common event.
Al Qaeda's strategic goals are, however, more obscure. Saudi Arabia
is the
golden egg. Economically, politically, religiously and socially, it
is a
perfect fit for al Qaeda's orientation and ambitions. The kingdom is
rich
beyond belief -- capable of influencing global oil supplies and, by
extension, global politics; it is religiously and socially Wahhabi,
fiercely
and independently tribal. It is the spiritual heartland of al Qaeda
itself.
Al Qaeda's endgame is simple: complete control of the oil-rich kingdom.
It
hopes to establish a transnational empire. At the heart of this pan-Islamic
Ummah (nation) would be Saudi Arabia, the home of Islam's two holiest
cities, Mecca and Medina, and the world's top oil exporter. This pan-Islamic
state -- with the Arabian Peninsula as the seat of sovereign authority
--
would serve as both the political and the religious leader of the Islamic
world.
Based in what is now called Saudi Arabia and with the ability to influence
global energy supplies, al Qaeda would have the tools to shape the political
and security environments of dozens of other states. It would also have
a
sanctuary where it could establish and train conventional armed forces
while
maintaining its cadres of militants.
The United States would never permit an al Qaeda government to come
to power
in the kingdom. The militant leadership knows this and is not likely
to put
forward its own government -- at least not directly. Instead, it will
look
to position leaders among the kingdom's tribal sheikhs, business elite
and
senior military officers -- as well as some members of the ruling House
of
Saud -- who are sympathetic to al Qaeda's worldview and willing to support
al Qaeda's long-term goal.
The Fight for Legitimacy
To achieve this end, al Qaeda must first weaken its opponents in the
government. There are several shorter-term goals for undercutting the
House
of Saud.
* Severing the link between the United States and the House of Saud.
* Undermining the House of Saud's political authority.
* Destroying the royal family's religious credentials.
Severing the link with Washington will restrict the Saudi government's
foreign policy options, reducing its ability to resist outside interference
from nations like Israel or Iran, as well as nonstate actors. When
Washington loses confidence in the Saudi government, it will ratchet
up its
already intense pressure on Riyadh to cooperate in the war against
terrorism. The hundreds of concessions and special privileges Saudis
enjoy
in the United States would come to a grinding halt.
A loss of Saudi political prerogatives -- both at home and abroad --
would
be a humiliating loss of face for the royal tribe and would resonate
throughout the kingdom, in turn reducing Saudi citizens' confidence
in and
support for the royal family. Loss of confidence in the royal family's
ability and right to rule directly challenges its legitimacy. Al Qaeda
has
openly criticized the regime's political and religious credentials,
labeling
it corrupt and hypocritical.
There is an emerging concern about the royal family's ability to rule.
The
current political turmoil, fueled by the constant attacks on Westerners
and
bombings of residential compounds, raises fears of political chaos.
Islamic
political thought traditionally emphasizes that a bad ruler is preferable
to
fitna (political chaos). Al Qaeda is now perhaps hoping to create just
enough political chaos to show that a bad ruler cannot prevent fitna.
A second attack on the regime's credentials centers around its religious
legitimacy. Osama bin Laden enjoys broad support inside the kingdom,
especially among the deeply pious. Many of his followers are thought
to be
from Qassim, the base of many prominent Wahhabi clerics. The country's
most
senior religious leader, Grand Mufti Abdel Aziz Al Al-Sheikh, recently
was
forced to defend religious rulings against accusations of excessive
political influence from the government.
Being accused of allowing political matters to have influence over
religious
matters is a damning charge. Most Islamic political thought -- including
Wahhabi thought -- argues that politics is and should be subservient
to
religion. In fact, most Islamic political thought makes no distinction
between political and religious rule.
The Wahhabis take this position to a radical level, seeing politics
as the
rightful domain of the religious leadership and other pious elites.
By
challenging the credibility of the religious establishment in Saudi
Arabia,
the opposition challenges the legitimacy not only of the government
but also
the senior religious leadership.
Money, Money, Money
Al Qaeda control of the kingdom does not necessarily mean either the
overthrow of the House of Saud -- at least at this stage -- or the more
immediate destruction of the country's oil infrastructure or disruption
of
oil exports. The kingdom is infinitely more valuable with its oil sector
intact. Al Qaeda will concentrate on weakening the regime and driving
Westerners from the Arabian Peninsula for the foreseeable future.
Al Qaeda does not want to trigger a U.S. invasion or any other serious
political backlash like a full-scale revolution or a fracturing of the
country that would restrict Riyadh's political reach. If it can find
a
cooperative branch or a support base within the royal family, then the
"regime" could persist -- at least in name -- even as Riyadh's
political
orientation shifts.
There could be short-term reasons for not completely displacing the
House of
Saud. The most immediate is money. Al Qaeda has long relied on financing
from the kingdom. There are persistent rumors that some members of the
royal
family back the militants financially and politically. The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency reports that al Qaeda has spent around $30 million
annually to finance operations. The U.S. commission looking into the
events
of Sept. 11 concluded that most of those funds came from "witting
and
unwitting donors, primarily in Persian Gulf countries, especially Saudi
Arabia." Some of the money is believed to have passed through charities.
The Saudi government claims it is going after the charities as a way
of
cutting off the financing. It has assumed control over the Al-Haramain
Foundation, a Saudi-based international charity that the U.S. government
has
linked to al Qaeda. Significantly, no key personnel, including the charity's
founder and chairman Aqeel al-Aqeel, have been arrested.
Al Qaeda needs to keep the money flowing, and that means not endangering
either its allies in the kingdom or the primary sources of revenue --
like
oil exports. If the regime moves aggressively to shut down its sources
of
financing, al Qaeda's calculus could change. It could accelerate the
timing
for targeting the regime directly. But at this stage, one charity less
will
not prevent al Qaeda's operations inside or beyond Saudi Arabia.
The Oil Weapon
The current phase of the war in Saudi Arabia is focused on getting
Westerners out of the kingdom. The withdrawal of the foreigners accomplishes
the goal of weakening U.S.-Saudi ties and leaving the energy industry
fully
in Saudi hands. Driving the Western infidels out of the kingdom would
also
serve as a powerful recruiting tool for al Qaeda.
Ousting Westerners also opens thousands of positions in the energy
and
defense industries, positions al Qaeda will hope to see filled with
Saudis
or other Muslims sympathetic to its worldview. Taking control of the
energy
industry would give al Qaeda global leverage. Running the energy industry
without the Western brain trust would be a challenge and could lead
to a
serious decline in Saudi output capacity. But with the resources available
to Aramco and other Saudi energy firms, a smaller but steady output
still
would give al Qaeda enormous political leverage abroad.
It is not in al Qaeda's interest at this phase in the war to strike
at the
Saudi oil infrastructure. Doing so would endanger a key source of its
financing, would be highly unpopular with the Saudi people -- who view
the
oil as their God-given inheritance -- and would not further the movement's
military objectives.
The Second Ikhwan Uprising
The next phase of the war is less certain, although it might imitate
the
last great rebellion in the kingdom.
In 1902, Abdel-Aziz bin Abdel-Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud, the founder
of
modern-day Saudi Arabia, returned from exile in Kuwait and seized Riyadh
and
much of the surrounding central Najd territory. Al-Saud -- who is better
known as Ibn Saud -- cobbled together an army known as the Ikhwan from
several of Arabia's nomadic and seminomadic tribes (bedouin) to conquer
Hail, the Hijaz and other parts of what now makes up the kingdom. By
1913
his forces had taken the oil-rich al-Ahsa or Eastern Province. In 1917,
with
the help of the Ikhwan bedouins, Ibn Saud inched his way toward Hail,
the
headquarters of the rival al Rashid tribe in northern Arabia, eventually
capturing it.
By 1926, he had ousted the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, and taken
the
Arabian Peninsula's western flank, known as the Hijaz. Ibn Saud's
territorial ambitions were halted soon thereafter. Britain had placed
sons
of the Sharif on the thrones in Iraq and Transjordan, and cut a deal
with
Riyadh to limit raids into these territories.
After the territorial expansion reached its limits, Ibn Saud moved
to
disband the Ikhwan army and settle the bedouin. The bedouin, however,
expected massive booty from the Hijaz and Hail victories and wanted
to keep
raiding into Iraq rather than settle down.
Two of the Ikhwan leaders -- who had expected but did not receive cushy
government appointments -- turned on Ibn Saud and began challenging
Riyadh.
Ibn Bijad, the top Ikhwan leader, had expected to be appointed military
chief after the kingdom's consolidation, but he was dismissed instead.
It is
thought that Ibn Saud feared Bijad, and Faisal al Duwish, the Ikhwan's
other
commander, posed a threat. In 1929, the Ikhwan rose in unsuccessful
rebellion against the regime.
There are a number of parallels between the current al Qaeda offensive
and
the 1929 Ikhwan rebellion.
Like Ibn Bijad, Osama bin Laden thought he would be rewarded with a
high-ranking military position upon his return from Afghanistan after
the
defeat of the Soviets. Instead, he was ignored and then denied permission
to
form an army to fight against an invasion after Saddam Hussein's forces
took
Kuwait in August 1990.
The Ikhwan accused Ibn Saud of dealing with the infidels, referring
to
Riyadh's relationship with Britain. Al Qaeda has condemned the Saudi
government for dealing with the infidels, Americans and Westerners in
general.
A critical divergence, however, is in targeting. Although the idea
of a
Saudi nationality did not exist back then, the underlying tribal alliance
system prevailed and the Ikhwan deliberately attacked tribes loyal to
Ibn
Saud.
Conclusion: The Second Phase
Al Qaeda has not taken this road -- at least not yet. But after cleansing
the holy lands of infidels, the movement will have thousands of radical
and
eager militants expecting action. Al Qaeda also has repeatedly and blatantly
accused the Saudi regime of corruption and hypocrisy and is not likely
simply to close up shop just because all the Americans have been routed.
In
fact, the militants have already struck at Saudi intelligence officials
and
headquarters.
The war is a guerrilla conflict with militant attacks focused on Westerners.
The next phase, however, will see a shift. The militants will reorient
the
conflict to directly targeting Saudi authorities. They will also move
to
establish themselves as a legitimate and viable political alternative.
Al Qaeda is also laying the foundation for a new regime. In a taped
speech
that was aired in January 2004, a speaker -- believed to be bin Laden
--
calls for the establishment of a legitimate and righteous political
leadership to replace the corrupt Arab governments now in power. He
says:
"The honest people who are concerned about this situation, such
as the
ulema, leaders who are obeyed among their people, dignitaries, notables
and
merchants should get together and meet in a safe place away from the
shadow
of these suppressive regimes and form a council for Ahl al-Hall wa al-Aqd
[literally 'those who loose and bind,' a reference to honest, wise and
righteous people who can appoint or remove a ruler in Islamic tradition]
to
fill the vacuum caused by the religious invalidation of these regimes
and
their mental deficiency." The implication is pointed: Riyadh is
corrupt and
a new leadership must arise to replace it.
Stratfor sources inside the kingdom all agree: The anti-Western guerrilla
war is only the initial phase. The countdown to a confrontation between
the
mujahideen and the Saudi government is certain. It is only a matter
of time.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
