Analysis
Last week, Stratfor's Terrorism Intelligence Weekly focused on the
likelihood that al Qaeda sleeper cells are in place within the United
States, and what countersurveillance operations could do to pre-empt an
attack. We now turn our attention to Saudi Arabia -- where recent events
also highlight the importance of effective countersurveillance techniques.
Tactical Evolution
U.S. counterterrorism sources recently have told Stratfor they believe new
attacks against expatriate housing compounds in Saudi Arabia are highly
probable -- a scenario that, in fact, was borne out early June 2, with a
shooting outside a compound in Riyadh.
The Saudi government so far has not shown any ability to curb militant
activity effectively. Given the sophistication of, and striking operational
similarities between, the recent attacks against Westerners in Yanbu and
Khobar -- and the fact that the militants appear to have sharpened the
deadliness of their tactics since the Yanbu strike in early May -- it
appears the militants are outpacing the Saudi security services.
In both cases, small -- four-man -- tactical groups carried out the
assaults, employing a high degree of stealth and precision. In Yanbu, at
least some of the gunmen were employees of ABB Lummus; they gained
unfettered access to the target through long association and the cover
provided by their company-issued uniforms. In Khobar, the assailants wore
military uniforms -- a tactic that would have aided their entrance into the
Al-Khobar Petroleum Center, the offices of Arab Petroleum Investments Corp.
and also their final destination, the Oasis compound. Uniforms likely also
aided their escape from the scene.
The targets themselves represent both a departure from attacks traditionally
associated with Islamist militants, and what might be the ideal target for
future operations abroad.
The energy-related facilities in Yanbu and Khobar were selected for two
reasons: First, they were symbols of Western business and influence in the
Muslim world, and they were relatively .soft. targets -- company offices and
residential compounds.
Symbolism -- as we have long been aware -- ranks high among al Qaeda.s
targeting priorities: Major attacks are planned with the goal of capturing
the attention not only of Westerners, but of the Muslim world. Symbolism
might have been on the minds of the militants when they dragged the body of
a Briton from Khobar behind a vehicle for more than two kilometers -- a
scene reminiscent of Mogadishu, Al Fallujah and Yanbu, and imagery that is
difficult to shake from the Western consciousness. By striking at the heart
of the Saudi oil industry, the militants also sent a message to sympathizers
who resent what they see as the theft of Arab wealth by foreign infidels.
From another perspective, the Oasis housing compound and oil offices in
Yanbu were lacking in security -- enhancing their attractiveness to
terrorists, because ideal targets like embassies and military installations
have increased security significantly since the Sept. 11 attacks. Assailants
have been forced to seek out large concentrations of Westerners elsewhere --
and the security at places like the Oasis housing compound is no match for
the sophistication the militants displayed.
Sophisticated Strikes
Judging from the details of the attacks and anecdotal evidence from the
survivors, both the Yanbu and Khobar strikes involved high levels of
pre-operational surveillance: Militants displayed intimate working knowledge
of the facilities. layouts and the routines of security guards.
. In both cases, the attacks took place in the morning -- when the day.s
activities were just beginning to get under way and, at the Oasis, when
gates were crowded with early-morning commuters.
. In the Oasis incident, militants set off a small explosive device at the
main gate as a diversion. They opened fire on vehicles at the compound.s
entrance, then moved toward the houses.
. Once inside the compound, militants literally went door-to-door, seeking
out Westerners for execution. As in Yanbu, they were careful to separate out
Muslims and anyone of Middle Eastern origin: for instance, a Christian woman
was allowed to go free after proving she was Lebanese, and an Iraqi American
man lived to tell the tale of being asked to prove he was a follower of
Islam. Similarly, in Yanbu, a militant passed by a Filipino native, saying,
.You are not what we are looking for..
One of the key differences between the Yanbu and Khobar incidents points to
the likely shape of future attacks: Precision strikes.
Although the Yanbu killings were carried out by a local Islamist militant
group, they were praised by al Qaeda.s top leader in the kingdom, Abdel Aziz
al-Muqrin, as a good example to follow in targeting Westerners in Saudi
Arabia. Days before the May 29 Khobar attack, al-Muqrin endorsed the use of
four-man cells in precision attacks. This statement meshed with al-Muqrin.s
writings in previous weeks and months that focused on several tactical
themes: strikes within cities, strikes against corporations, assassinations
and kidnappings.
Notably, the Khobar attacks were claimed by al-Muqrin himself -- a sign that
al Qaeda not only approves small-scale, precision strikes, but is adapting
its operations.
A Matter of Security
There is little that governments, businesses or expatriates in Saudi Arabia
can do to protect themselves from these kinds of attacks, other than
stepping up security around housing compounds and offices. And that in
itself could be a questionable solution, if local -- mostly government --
security forces are employed.
At the Oasis compound, the gate guards -- who were unarmed -- fled at the
first sign of violence. Afterward three of the four gunmen managed to escape
arrest, even though they were surrounded by Saudi security forces -- a fact
that suggests either incompetence or complicity on the part of the security
forces, and certainly does nothing to alleviate fears of follow-on attacks.
Tactically speaking, aggressive countersurveillance measures will be
necessary if further attacks are to be thwarted. Because the militants
obviously employed extensive pre-operational surveillance of the targets in
Yanbu and Khobar, security services would be needed to watch for any signs
of such activity around other Western-oriented facilities. An aggressive
countersurveillance program -- by trained security personnel -- can be very
effective in disrupting militant plans. Once surveillance is noted, the
Saudi authorities ideally would be contacted immediately to investigate and
intercede as necessary.
That said, it is difficult to understand why, in the aftermath of Yanbu, a
permanent Saudi police presence was not in place at the Oasis compound in
Khobar. It is possible that the kingdom.s security officials believed
threats were limited to Riyadh and, to a lesser extent, the Red Sea coast.
However, the recent trend has demonstrated that militants have a much wider
geographic reach -- possibly nationwide -- and it would be surprising if
security is not heightened around other Western facilities and neighborhoods
throughout the kingdom. If government and local security services continue
with business as usual, the militants will be able to as well.
Given the blows that Islamist militants have struck -- against both
Westerners and, by extension, the Saudi regime -- in recent weeks, the
support they have garnered from al Qaeda and the inability of the security
infrastructure to deal with the threat, Stratfor sees an inevitable increase
in the use of small assault teams in strikes against Western assets in the
kingdom and beyond. Given the success rate of such actions so far --
compared to recent failures to carry out large-scale suicide attacks in
Jordan, and the manpower, investment and false starts that went into recent
successful suicide bombings in Riyadh, this methodology of precision over
fire-power easily could be adapted to many circumstances and theaters of
operation in which Islamist militants have a vested interest in striking at
the West.
Source: Stratfor
